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For the Want of a Nail. . . the War was
Lost: Separation of Powers and United
States Counter-Terrorism Policy
During the Reagan Years
When terrorism strikes, civilization itself is under attack, no nation
is immune. There's no safety in silence or neutrality. If we permit
terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like a cancer ....
We cannot accept these repeated and vicious attacks against our
nation and its citizens. Terrorists, and those who support them,
must and will be held to account.
Ronald Reagan'
I. Introduction
Terrorism evokes feelings of fear, ethnic distrust, and frustration
over the means of dealing with terrorists and their political grievances.
United States counter-terrorism policy is constrained by constitutional,
political, ethical, and international considerations. Like the elephant
bothered by a flea, the United States as a whole is affected by the actions
of small terrorist groups.2 The elephant may use its trunk to swat the
offending parasite, but only discretion and timing, not raw strength, will
relieve the situation. Successful counter-terrorism programs require pre-
cise, directed action. The question that plagues the national effort con-
cerns which political branch is better suited to direct the implementation
of antiterrorism policies.
Normatively, the executive, not the legislative, branch is better
suited to plan and implement antiterrorism programs. It is as important
to support this statement as it is to describe the means by which potential
abuses of such a broad mandate may be avoided. The raw use of power
must be constrained by the ethical concerns of the greater polity to avoid
aimless and uncontrolled strikes at terrorism.
Three elements underlie effective counter-terrorism programs: intel-
ligence gathering, secrecy of operation, and consistency between policy
pronouncements and actions. An antiterrorism bureaucracy must be ca-
l. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
2. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, DEP'T DEFENSE 1 (1988) [hereinafter TERRORIST
GRouP PROFILES] ("Mostly small, tightly knit, and politically homogeneous, such [terrorist]
groups are incapable of developing popular support for their radical positions and therefore
resort to terrorism to gain influence.").
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pable of identifying terrorist situations, then quickly planning and imple-
menting fact-specific responses. Active congressional oversight would
require more time than the resolution of such situations generally allows.
The structure of congressional decision-making-with committee meet-
ings, open debates, and legislative log-rolling-better suits the design of
policy than its implementation.
This Note will examine how, given the separation-of-powers tension
and the divergent structures of the two political branches, United States
counter-terrorism programs have differed from legislative policy. This
discussion will highlight a new direction for both the legislative role in
fighting terrorism and provide a way for a strong executive branch to
meet its own goals in programmatic implementation without totally insu-
lating itself from congressional purposes.
Subpart I(A) describes a systemic difference between the two polit-
ical branches and how this may affect counter-terrorism policies and pro-
grams. A discussion of the constitutional tension in the separation-of-
powers arena will follow. Part II then will present the foreign affairs
power specifically and explain how Supreme Court policy and the dichot-
omy raised in subpart I(A) have affected traditional separation-of-powers
arguments between the legislative and executive branches in counter-ter-
rorism. Subpart II(B) will present a hypothetical situation that high-
lights the problems with current United States antiterrorism policy. Part
III then will discuss terrorism itself and why the lack of a functional
definition has limited the efficacy of United States actions in the control
and resolution of international terrorism. Part IV points to the potential
responses to terrorism and focuses on the concept of foreign policy by
force. Part V presents the United States efforts to combat terrorism dur-
ing the Reagan years and Part VI then compares the hypothetical scena-
rio to the actual policy and demonstrates how far afield future efforts
might travel from the legislative intent.
A. The Proactive/Reactive Dichotomy
The executive branch stresses short-term action over long-range pol-
icy goals. This emphasis, at least in the counter-terrorism area, differs
functionally from legislative branch concerns. A simple model, the
proactive/reactive dichotomy, highlights these differences and provides a
means of analyzing recent United States counter-terrorism legislation
and programmatic efforts.
The United States record in prevention and resolution of interna-
tional terrorist incidents3 during President Reagan's tenure has been
3. The scope of this Note is limited to international terrorism. International terrorism is
terrorism affecting the citizens of more than one country. For a brief discussion of domestic
terrorism concerns, see infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
soundly criticized by the press, 4 legal scholars,' and members of Con-
gress.6 With United States responses to terrorism varying from military
reprisal7 to providing the nephew of the Speaker of the Iranian Parlia-
ment with "escort services to arrange for night visitors to... [his] ho-
tel,"' this period has been described as "an account of failure, with
precious few victories in between."9 Yet the executive branch claims that
the record does not truly reflect the volume of successes'0 and that by the
relation of goals sought to outcomes received, what has been viewed as
4. See generally CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM (P. Wilkinson & A. M.
Stewart eds. 1987); D. MARTIN & J. WALcoTr, BEST LAID PLANS: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST TERRORISM (1988); Note, The First Amendment and National Se-
curity: The Constitutionality of Press Censorship and Access Denial in Military Operations, 17
INT'L L. & POL. 369 (1985); Note, The Press and the Invasion of Grenada: Does the First
Amendment Guarantee the Press a Right of Access to Wartime News?, 58 TEMp. L.Q. 873
(1985); Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and The Need For a New Analytic
Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 813 (1987).
5. See generally Levitt, Is "Terrorism" Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 97
(1986); Halberstam, Terrorism, 9 GEo. MASON U.L. REV. 12 (1986); Quigley, Eliminating
Terrorism: A Law and Justice Approach, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 47 (1987); Paust, An Introduc-
tion to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN. L. REV. 697 (1987); M.
CELMER, TERRORISM, U.S. STRATEGY, AND REAGAN POLICIES (1987).
6. See generally HOUSE COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 100M CONG., 1ST SESS.,
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND EXECuTIv, DOCUMENTS (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter HOUSE RE-
PORT]; War Powers, Libya and State-Sponsored Terrorism, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 29, May 1, and May 15, 1986) [hereinafter War Powers Hearing].
7. The military reprisal theme is borne out most specifically by the United States bomb-
ing of Libya on April 14, 1986, but could also include the shelling of Lebanon in 1985. M.
CELMER, supra note 5, at 151-52. Marc Celmer draws a crucial distinction in the use of force
between actions in self-defense and actions with reprisal as the theme. Id. at 107-08. This
distinction will be drawn out in detail, see infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text, with the
discussion of the Shultz doctrine.
8. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 356.
9. Id. at xi. The authors qualify this indictment, stating that "Best Laid Plans is not just
a tale of unrelieved failure, it is also a story of courage and conviction, of brave men doing
what they believed was right." Id. This qualification is illustrative of the general media reac-
tion to United States actions with regard to terrorism management-that the government
means well but has no clear idea of the consequences of their actions. One purpose of this
Note is to carry this qualification one step further-to address the systemic failure to define
and agree on the terms the Legislature will apply to terrorism policy.
10. The executive branch claims that secrecy concerns prevent the publication of all suc-
cessful antiterrorism operations. "Successful preemption of terrorist attacks is seldom publi-
cized because of the sensitive intelligence that may be compromised." PUBLIC REPORT OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM 9 (1986) [hereinafter
PUBLIC REPORT]. Contra M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 113 (argues against the "secret" suc-
cesses claimed by the Reagan administration, stating that "the Reagan administration's ap-
proach has had no positive impact on the deterrence, prevention and suppression of
international terrorism.").
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failure actually represents triumph.1'
This difference of opinion illustrates the way in which the goals
sought through terrorism-related policy affect the subsequent analysis of
any actions taken. This is not simply a truism. Even a successful antiter-
rorist action 2 may be challenged if disagreement exists over the goals
sought by the overall policy. The programmatic implementation must be
distinguished from the underlying policy concerns to fully appreciate the
arguments justifying or condemning specific actions.' 3
The executive branch has favored an action-based approach to
counter-terrorism programs. This "ends justifies the means" attitude
leads the executive to proactive policies. President Reagan's statement,
opening this Note, indicates the executive-branch motivations guiding
the antiterrorism efforts of the past eight years. The goal of preempting
the spread of terrorism leads to What this Note defines as "proactive"' 4
policies. The stated purpose of proactive programs is to halt terrorism
11. An illustration of this point is provided by the statement that "one person's freedom
fighter is another's terrorist." This phrase is used in the isolationist argument contesting
United States interference in actions not directly affecting the nation or its citizens. Interest-
ingly, this phrase was also used in a State Department publication. D. MARTIN & J.
WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 53. In 1987 former Vice-President Bush stated: "Terrorists and
their apologists frequently claim that they are merely 'soldiers' or 'guerrillas' or 'freedom fight-
ers' in a struggle for national liberation. I reject this premise." 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 4 (Apr.
1987). In November of 1988, President-elect Bush continued: "The difference between ter-
rorists and freedom fighters is sometimes clouded.... The philosophical differences are stark
and fundamental.... Terrorists deliberately target noncombatants for their own cynical pur-
poses.... [F]reedom fighters, in contrast, seek to adhere to international law and civilized
standards of conduct." Bush, prefatory letter, TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 2, at
iv.
12. A successful counter-terrorist action is one that alleviates the specific problem to be
addressed. Examples include hostage rescue operations utilizing either military or less violent
pressures, preemptive actions that halt the terrorism before its implementation, or even pre-
ventative military strikes on terrorist training camps while the act is in its training phase.
13. An illustration of such an action is a hostage rescue attempt, utilizing military force
and resulting in the deaths of several innocent bystanders. The programmatic goal-rescue-
is achieved. If the policy goals do not allow for harm to innocent parties, however, the action
is also in some way a failure. Thus former Secretary of State George Shultz was forced to
defend the April 15, 1986 raid on Libya in terms of its programmatic success. "[A]sked how
the raid could be called a success when 'women and children were killed,' Shultz said: 'Some-
times, of course, when civilians put themselves in a military place, they open themselves to this
kind of unfortunate byproduct.'" U.S. Ties Soviet Inaction on Terror to Raid, L.A. Times,
Apr. 17, 1986, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4.
14. Proactive policies are those that would preempt terrorism through bilateral, multilat-
eral, and unilateral actions against the terrorists. For existing terrorist organizations these
programs would take the form of intelligence gathering and military action, both reactive and
preemptive, utilizing existing antiterrorist strike forces. A definition that would support such
legislation would have a broad, generic substantive description with a general intent element.
Levitt, supra note 5, at 108. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
through preventative military and intelligence activities.15 Proactive
counter-terrorism policies will be systemically different from those
ascribed to the reactive legislative branch.
Congress traditionally has directed its antiterrorism efforts toward
"reactive"' 16 programs. Legislative policy is designed to resolve terrorist
incidents as they arise. Unlike their proactive counterparts, these pro-
grams attempt to halt the spread of terrorism through criminal sanctions
derived from multilateral agreements and diplomatic discussions.
The relationship between proactive and reactive states of mind is at
best a troubled one. Proactive "self-help" measures offend the reactive
"wait and see" attitude. When the President attempts an affirmative ac-
tion, this precludes the option of more diplomatic resolution. As Part IV
discusses, the difference is not so much one of means as timing within a
specific terrorist episode. Unquestionably, situations will arise when
even a reactive Congress will say action is necessary, however this gener-
ally will serve as an effort of last resort for the legislature while remaining
a continuing option in the executive arsenal.
This dysfunctional relationship between the legislative and the exec-
utive branches accounts for much of the confusion surrounding United
States action, and inaction, regarding counter-terrorism in the 1980s.
This proactive/reactive dichotomy is evidenced by the differences in ex-
ecutive and legislative branch definitions for terrorism. This Note must
first address the underlying problem: how the separation-of-powers ten-
sion and the Court's response to ambiguous constitutional delegations of
power has exacerbated this dichotomy.
B. The Constitutional Underpinnings
In the foreign affairs arena the dichotomy arises by virtue of consti-
tutional delegation. The political separation-of-powers tension was
designed to prevent one political branch from holding too much federal
power relative to the other branches. This subpart describes the classical
arguments over the actual levels of powers granted by the Constitution.
The next part will explain how this tension has been heightened through
the Court's use of the political question, the nonjusticiability of issues,
and the ambiguity of congressional intent doctrines. 7
15. Such programs will not be limited to preemptive actions. Retroactive programs may
be utilized as well, continuing the executive branch goal of deterring the onset of new acts of
terrorism. See infra notes 144-148 and accompanying text.
16. Reactive policies are directed at halting specific categories of terrorist actions. A defi-
nition supporting reactive policy goals uses precise substantive language to describe the act,
with a minimal level of necessary intent. See generally Paust, supra note 5; infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
17. Specifically, the Court's use of the political question doctrine and other prudential
readings of statutory construction will be presented. These define the parameters within which
Presidents will place their options. For example, one commentator states that "[b]y use of the
Snrina 19901 COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY
614 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 17:609
Exactly who should wield the United State foreign affairs powers
has been a subject of contention since the framing of the Constitution.
Article II states that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America."18 Article I states that "[a]n legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States." 1 The lack of the limiting "herein granted" language on the ex-
ecutive power has fueled much of the dissension between those who
would have the foreign affairs powers fall more to one political branch
than to the other.
Advocates of a strong presidential power argue that the President
"is permitted to exercise authority not specifically delineated in the Con-
stitution"'2 to either the executive or the legislative branch. This
Hamiltonian view contrasts with the Madisonian notion that the purpose
of the limiting Article I language was only to "settle the question of
whether the executive branch should be plural or singular and to give the
Executive a title."21 Wherever one falls along the strong/weak presiden-
tial power scale, the separation-of-powers tension will be felt most
strongly in areas of weak constitutional authority, such as the foreign
affairs power.
The maxim that "absolute power corrupts absolutely" takes on a
secondary meaning in the context of foreign affairs and the separation of
powers. Shared power, without limits imposed on the relative distribu-
tion of that power, will lead both sides to attempt to garner more than an
equal or defined allocation. An example of Congress extending its explic-
itly granted foreign policy powers22 is found in the legislative limits
[political question] doctrine, the Court leaves Congress and the executive in a perpetual state
of tension over foreign affairs, with the power most frequently allowed to the executive when
he chooses to exercise it.... A frequent result is that executive action goes unchallenged and
remains unhallengeable .... ." Comment, The Supreme Court as Interpreter of Executive
Foreign Affairs Powers, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 161, 178 (1987).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
20. Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for Ju-
dicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 836, 868 (1983) (citing Alexander Hamilton: "The general
doctrine of our Constitution... is, that the executive power of the nation is vested in the
President; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the instru-
ment." Alexander Hamilton, The First Letter of "Pacifus" (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 1 W.
GOLDSMITH, THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 401
(1974)).
21. Id. (citing Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
COLUM. L. REv. 53, 53 (1953)).
22. The article I, section 8 congressional powers relating to the foreign affairs of the
United States are set forth in a commentary on foreign relations:
"Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." Congress is endowed with
the power to lay taxes "for the common Defence," to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, to regulate the value of money, including that of foreign coin, to "Define and
Punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas and Offenses against the
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY
placed on executive branch authority to commit the United States unilat-
erally to a prolonged military engagement.2" As described below, the
history of the shared foreign affairs power has been fraught with less than
cooperative acts by both Congress and the President.24
Congress argues that the Executive has only those powers granted
by enabling legislation. The President, however, claims a range of im-
plied powers derived from a combination of the "sole organ" doctrine25
and through the lack of limiting constitutional language. Professor
Chemerinsky divides the spectrum of presidential power into four cate-
gories.26 His framework contains Madisonian,27 interstitial,2 legislative
accountability,29 and Hamiltonian ° doctrines. The application of each
of these doctrines profoundly affects the balance of power between Con-
gress and the President. Complicating the matter, the Court has at dif-
ferent times endorsed each of these separate doctrines. The Court's
inconsistent pronouncements regarding the foreign affairs power has
muddied the waters, increasing the natural separation-of-powers tension.
Law of Nations," "to raise and support Armies," to "provide and maintain a Navy,"
"to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions," as well as the power to make all laws necessary
and proper to carry into execution those powers vested in Congress and in the other
branches of the federal government.
Comment, supra note 17, at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
23, While the power to declare war is mandated to Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the
Executive may unilaterally commit the military forces for indeterminate periods of time. The
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1982), see infra notes 241-252 and accompanying
text, was passed to address this issue.
24. See infra notes 31-73, 151-161 and accompanying text.
25. The sole organ doctrine is a common law interpretation of the President as the sover-
eign representative of the United States. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for the
history of this doctrine.
26. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 871.
27. Id. Madisonian proponents subscribe to the theory that there is no inherent presiden-
tial power (as described in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
('The President's power, if any, to issue the [seizure] order must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.")).
28. Id at 872. Interstitial power is described by a President who may "act so long as the
prerogatives of another branch are not usurped" (as described in United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1973) (the President may claim an inherent executive power until infringing on the
functions of another government branch)).
29. Id. This aspect is illustrated by Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (the Court
will not decide issues affecting the separation of powers until an actual conflict presents itself
between the political branches).
30. Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 878. The presidential power is broad, subject only to
constitutional exclusions. Examples of Hamiltonian notions include United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (the foreign policy power is inherent to the presi-
dential office) and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (congressional inaction in
the face of continuous presidential action implies approval of those actions).
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II. The Foreign Affairs Power
A. The Court: Muddy Waters, The Separation of Powers, and
Congressional Foot-in-Mouth Disease
When John Marshall first coined the term "sole organ" to describe
the presidential foreign affairs role, he began almost two hundred years
of separation-of-powers controversy.31 It is not surprising, given the
competing power structure of the United States political system, that the
legislative and executive branches have this long history of arguments
over the limits to one another's authority. Surprisingly, the Court has
played a role in this conflict as well. Marshall, speaking from the floor of
the House of Representatives, established the sole organ precedent.32 As
Chief Justice Marshall, four years later, he limited this sovereign power
when faced with President Adams's seizure and condemnation of certain
vessels. 33  Commentators have found Justice Marshall's opinion "ex-
traordinary.., for what it does not say, on issues that might have pro-
vided Little with a plausible defense: nonjusticiability of political matters,
ambiguity of Congressional intent, and infringement upon the President's
'sole organ' power."' 34  Professor Glennon uses the word "extraordi-
nary" 35 because, since Little, the Court has fairly consistently relied on
these three factors to avoid interference in foreign policy questions.
The first factor, the political question doctrine,36 has enabled the
31. See supra note 25. "'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.'" Glennon, Two Views of Presiden-
tial Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss- Wright, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 10
(1988) (citing to Marshall's speech in 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)). Glennon points to
Justice Jackson's opinion of the sole organ precedent: "'It lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need."' Id. at 14 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945)).
32. Glennon, supra note 31, at 10.
33. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (Little was the ship's captain who
seized the Flying Fish pursuant to a presidential order which departed from the authority
granted by Congress in the Non-Intercourse Act (1799) (expired 1800)). See Glennon, supra
note 31, at 5-8.
34. Glennon, supra note 31, at 9 (footnotes omitted).
35. Linda Champlin and Alan Schwarz present this issue succinctly. "It seems incredible
that after two hundred years of life under a written constitution which delineates governmental
power and its allocation, and which creates a Supreme Court to definitively determine contro-
versies about power and its allocation, the most basic questions concerning allocation of the
foreign affairs power remain unanswered." Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine
and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HoFs'rA L. REv. 215, 216 (1985). Senator
Hatch would not find this so incredible: "The Framers of our Republic intended to create
some friction between the branches .... [E]ificiency was readily sacrificed because it was
considered likely to produce impassioned solutions that might endanger individual liberties."
Hatch, Avoidance of Constitutional Conflicts, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 1025, 1027-28 (1987).
36. Professors Champlin and Schwarz find that "[n]on-justiciability ... exists separately
from the political question doctrine.... In the political question context... the issue itself,
Court to avoid answering foreign affairs powers questions necessary to
resolve the vague constitutional mandate. The Court has raised the doc-
trine in foreign affairs power conflicts for many reasons, only two of
which have been "consistently and coherently articulated":37 the "lack
of clear standards for judicial determination and the need to attribute
finality to coordinate branch decisions."38
Professor Glennon's second and third factors, ambiguous congres-
sional intent and the "sole organ" power, have played a greater role in
defining the scope of congressional foreign policy powers than has the
political question doctrine. The political question doctrine may be used
by the Court to avoid passing judgment altogether; findings of ambiguous
congressional intent and a belief in an inherent presidential power serve
to accentuate the allocation of power contest. The two criteria have be-
come interwoven over time to provide the Court with a way to keep ques-
tions involving either or both of these attributes off the docket.39 The
effect of this has been to grant approval by default without ever discuss-
ing the questions raised by the political branch seeking resolution.
In foreign affairs matters, the Court will defer to the executive
power in at least three situations. The first is when it appears that Con-
independent of the status of the parties, has been termed non-justiciable." Champlin &
Schwarz, supra note 35, at 231-32. Glennon's terminology, "non-justiciability of political mat-
ters," eliminates this concern, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 35, at 219. It is interesting to note that although
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), was a domestic case, it is often cited for its political
question application in foreign affairs.
38. Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 35, at 219. These factors were laid out clearly in
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), the most recent lower court decision ad-
dressing a foreign affairs power controversy. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Tennessee voting apportionment
case declared a political question), set out the standard list of factors used today in determining
whether a case falls under the political question doctrine:
Prominent [factors include] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impos-
sibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestion-
ing adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 221, also quoted in Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340. For a concise discussion of
"What Makes a Question 'Political'?" see Champlin & Schwarz, supra note 35, at 220-24.
The most important of these considerations, for the purposes of this Note, is the potential
embarrassment that would result if the Court, the Executive, and Congress were to present
different counter-terrorism policy statements and commitments to the world. For example, if
the President were to promise United States aid in the event of a terrorist incident to a foreign
head of state, then when that aid was necessary, Congress refused to fund the program, backed
by the Court, foreign nations would be ill impressed by future presidential commitments, even
if supported by Congress.
39. See, ag., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
Svring 19901 COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY
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gress is unable to formulate a definitive policy." The second is when a
statute is open to an interpretation that would lead the President to act in
a manner inconsistent with stated Congressional intent, but that would
nonetheless be accepted by foreign nations.4 1 The third situation arises
when Congress does not act at all and the Executive is able to relate his
or her behavior to some aspect of inherent or explicit constitutional
authority.42
Lowry v. Reagan,43 while not a Supreme Court case, provides a clear
example of the use of the political question doctrine to throw an issue
back to the political actors. Three Senators and over one hundred mem-
bers of the House of Representatives joined together" to force President
Reagan to comply with the reporting requirements of the War Powers
Resolution.45 The congresspersons claimed that the 1987 introduction of
United States military forces into the Persian Gulf, and the hostilities
that followed, triggered the President's obligation to file a written report
with the heads of both Houses.46 "The Court dedline[d] to exercise juris-
diction over this case in light of prudential considerations associated with
the exercise of equity jurisdiction and the constraints of the political
question doctrine."'47
The court followed the dismissal with a "remedial discretion"4 dis-
cussion of why equity jurisdiction was declined and how the situation
would have to change before "the Court would risk 'the potentiality of
embarrassment [that would result] from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.' ",4 The fact that "several bills to
compel the President to invoke section 4(a)(1)" 5 ° and alternative bills to
strengthen and repeal the War Powers Resolution5" were introduced in
Congress indicated to the court that the plaintiffs were looking to the
judicial branch "to resolve a question that Congress seemed unwilling t6
decide."52 Although the court declined to accept jurisdiction, it did indi-
cate that a "true confrontation between the Executive and a unified Con-
40. Id. at 338-39.
41. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1982).
42. "The Court has thus become an unacknowledged coparticipant in foreign affairs by
endowing the executive with extra-constitutional authority derived from international law, no-
tions of sovereignty, and congressional action or inaction." Comment, supra note 17, at 203.
43. 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). For a general analysis, see Comment, Constitutional
Law: Judicial Restraint and the War Powers Resolution-Lowry v. Reagan, 11 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. PoL'Y 849 (1988).
44. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337.
45. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
46. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 334.
47. Id. at 337 (footnote omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 340 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
50. Id. at 338 (footnote omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. (footnote omitted) (paraphrasing Sen. Brock Adams).
gress . . . would pose a question ripe for judicial review. ' '5 3
Congressional inability to reach a consensus prevented the resolution of
this dispute."4 But even in those instances in which Congress does act as
a unitary whole, as illustrated below, the foreign policy powers clash may
still be resolved in favor of the Executive.5
The key Supreme Court rulings resolving foreign affairs power dis-
putes in favor of the President may be roughly placedinto the ambiguous
congressional intent and inherent presidential power categories presented
above. 6  Weinberger v. Rossi 7 proves an excellent example of the
Court's response to legislative drafting gone awry. Dames & Moore v.
Regan,sB INS v. Chadha,9 and the ship seizure cases' are examples of
judicial acquiescence to an inherent presidential power.
The Court has paid close attention to legislative drafting in disputes
between the Legislature and the Executive over the foreign affairs power.
An example that may prove important in the discussion of current
United States antiterrorism policy involves the use of the overbroad term
"international agreement" in lieu of the more specific "treaty." Rossi
provides that if Congress wants to authorize the President to seek treaty
formulation, but still reserve approval and ratification power for itself,
the use of the word "treaty" alone in the enabling legislation is not suffi-
cient.61 The Court will interpret such an ambiguous congressional ex-
pression to include the international understanding of a treaty: an
international agreement made between sovereigns.62 This point is rele-
vant to the hypothetical scenario presented in subpart II(A), with partic-
53. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted) (for a true confrontation to arise, Congress must pass a
joint resolution, which the President then refuses to honor).
54. The Court specifically did not pass on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolu-
tion because the issue was not raised by the parties. Id. at 337. This issue is left unresolved
and, as will be presented infra notes 303-307 and accompanying text, leaves open one of the
last potential means of controlling the preemptive military strike scenario.
55. See supra note 25.
56. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
57. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
58. 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (continued reliance on J. Sutherland's'contention that the
presidential powers are inherent to the office).
59. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
60. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dal].) 37 (1800); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
61. The Court will "ascertain as best [it] can whether Congress intended the word 'treaty'
to refer solely to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ... or whether Congress intended 'treaty' to also include
executive agreements .... ." Rossi, 456 U.S. at 29.
62. Id. at 28-32. ("In the case of a statute ... that does touch upon the United States'
foreign policy, there is even more reason to construe [the] use of 'treaty' to include interna-
tional agreements. . . ." Id. at 31); see also Note, Executive Agreements in the Aftermath of
Weinberger v. Ross!: Undermining the Constitutional Treaty-Making Power, 6 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 636, 640 (1983) (The Rossi court relied on Altman, which had established that the word
"'[treaty'... included international agreements made by the President pursuant to congres-
sional authorization") (citing B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (the
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ular regard to the legislative draft to the President to seek international
agreements on counter-terrorism issues.6"
The Court will also support the Executive in certain situations
where inherent presidential power may be found. The Dames & Moore
and Chadha opinions illustrate this point. Dames & Moore evidenced a
"willingness [by the Court] to bow to executive power where a more or
less convincing argument for Congressional acquiescence can be made,
especially during international crises, thereby effectively placing execu-
tive action beyond judicial review."" The executive orders complained
of by Dames and Moore suspended all ongoing litigation between the
United States and Iran, and established a Claims Tribunal to settle ex-
isting private claims through arbitration.65 The Court interpreted the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to grant an implied pres-
idential authority to suspend such claims.66 As with the international
agreement/treaty commonality principle described by the Rossi Court,
presidential authority was extended for the purposes of granting sover-
eign consistency in the foreign relations arena.6'
INS v. Chadha 6 struck down a congressional delegation to the ex-
ecutive branch because of its effect on the constitutional bicameralism
requirement.69 The one-House veto retained by the Legislature in the
Immigration and Nationality Act,7" although drafted to check the dele-
gation to the Executive, did not meet the Court's requirement of careful
and full consideration of the constitutional consequences.7" This further
illustrates the Court's influence on the foreign affairs interbranch power
conflict.
Like Rossi, Chadha also serves as a judicial wrist slap for poor con-
gressional drafting. The implications of this, when considered in con-
junction with the ambiguous definitions of terrorism, are grave. 2 The
word "treaty" used in the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891 included international
agreements)).
63. See infra notes 231, 236, 292-293 and accompanying text.
64. Comment, supra note 17, at 196. Chemerisky places the Dames & Moore opinion
under the broadest, Hamiltonian view of inherent presidential authority. Chemerinsky, supra
note 20, at 877.
65. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654.
66. Id. at 669-74.
67. Id. at 678.
68. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). This case arose when the House of Representatives passed a
resolution invalidating the Attorney General's suspension of a deportation order. The de-
portee, Chadha, challenged the constitutionality of the congressional action.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1970).
71. "By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed
majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief ... that
legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Na-
tion's elected officials." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-49.
72. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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combination of the Dames & Moore implied presidential authority, the
promise of further judicial "wrist slapping" for faulty drafting, and the
"sole organ" doctrine of inherent presidential power provide a frame-
work within which the executive branch is largely unconstrained in its
counter-terrorism efforts. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking on the power
of the Legislature in M'Culloch v. Maryland, stated: "[1]et the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are constitutional."73 In the context of the above cases, this state-
ment seems better applied today to the powers of the President than to
Congress.
B. Presidential Power and the Military "Solution" to Terrorism
The proactive/reactive dichotomy illuminates some of the reasons
why political branch disagreements over the goals to be served in the
fight against terrorism limit the effectiveness of national policy. The leg-
islative branch has attempted to cure the problem, as perceived, through
legislating protection for United States nationals7' and through delega-
tions of authority to the Executive." The President thus has been left
frqe to work toward proactive policy goals, paying slight attention to the
reactive interests of Congress.
To illustrate this point, a hypothetical scenario is presented. This
will test the limits of presidential power under current U.S. antiterrorism
law and policy. This hypothetical situation is as follows:
President Bush launches a unilateral preemptive military strike at a
terrorist training camp in the Middle East. In a message to Con-
gress, the President lists several justifications for the military ac-
tion. First, intelligence evidence had shed light on a terrorist
attack in its planning and training stages. This attack was to have
been directed against persons within the continental United States.
Second, the decision to go ahead with a unilateral military action
was made in the interests of timeliness and secrecy. In light of the
initial failure of the European nations to believe United States evi-
dence on the Libyan biochemical plant in 1989 and the difficulties
presented in overflight authorizations necessary for the 1986 Libya
raid,76 the State Department decided to forgo a joint military ac-
tion. In order to preserve secrecy, Congress was not consulted'
prior to this military strike.
73. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
74. See infra notes 204-255 and accompanying text.
75. These delegations include a draft to seek multilateral cooperation in formulating inter-
national standards for antiterrorism programs. See infra notes 229-230, 236 and accompany-
ing text.
76. See infra notes 304-306 and accompanying text.
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This seemingly far-fetched scenario implicates many of the constitu-
tional questions described in the beginning of this subpart.77 Still, a com-
plete analysis of the hypothetical situation requires a basic identification
of the relevant variables necessary to an understanding of terrorism and
the history of the United States response. Parts III through V of this
Note will identify such issues. These variables will be defined through an
examination of the following questions: are there any constitutional di-
rectives inhibiting presidential freedom of action in foreign affairs; are
legislative or judicial structures in place to review and limit the presiden-
tial foreign affairs powers with regard to counter-terrorism; and, if so, are
these structures functionally effective. The answers to these questions
provide the framework within which the viability of the hypothetical sce-
nario may be judged.
The preemptive strike scenario challenges the right of the Executive
to commit United States military forces in a counter-terrorist action, ab-
sent a declaration of war.78 This avenue of response is one of many avail-
able in the battle against terrorism. 79  The definitional problems
addressed in the following part apply equally well to any counter-terror-
ism response. However, the proactive/reactive model8" is most powerful
when applied to illustrating the plausibility of military force in counter-
terrorism operations.
Before discussing the remaining structure of this Note, it may be
helpful to identify the critical points of the hypothetical scenario. The
unilateral action of the executive branch is at odds with the reactive pol-
icy goal of international cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. The
secrecy and timeliness concerns raised by President Bush implicate the
reporting requirements placed on the Executive by the War Powers Res-
olution." Finally, the preemptive nature of the action must be addressed
in light of the justifications historically raised for military antiterrorist
77. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. Given the recent events in Panama and
Colombia, the potential for the hypothetical scenario becomes less remote. See infra notes
314-336 and accompanying text.
78. Specifically, the concern is with the efficacy of the War Powers Resolution and the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS: LAws AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1865 (1986) [hereinafter Omni-
bus Act] in limiting the available range of presidential actions.
79. Parts IV(A) and (B), infra notes 121-150 and accompanying text, briefly address other
options as they have been discussed in recent legal commentary.
80. Any simple model is limited by its poor explanatory value regarding micro-activities.
Even though the simple model may not predict well the actions of individuals within a political
branch, a bureaucracy grows to have a "personality" of its own. Thus, the benefit of a simple
model is found in its ability to predict policy trends for such macro-organisms.
81. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The issue raised is whether the War Powers
Resolution reporting requirements apply to counter-terrorist situations, and if so, whether con-
sultation or simple reporting is indicated. See infra notes 242-256 and accompanying text.
actions.8 2 These issues are addressed in part VI of this Note.
Returning to the viability of such a scenario, the argument evolves
in three parts. This section described the evolution of the separation-of-
powers doctrine and how its effect on inherent presidential foreign affairs
powers has defined the parameters of potential governmental antiter-
rorist policy.8
3
Part III examines the attempts made to define terrorism. This
serves two purposes: first, to illustrate the proactive/reactive dichotomy;
and second, to illustrate the way in which such definitions have been
utilized by the political branches to further their divergent outcome-
based philosophies. This dichotomous relationship between the policy
goals of each political branch exacerbates an already artificially strained
separation of foreign policy powers.8 4 The final argument presented in
Part III provides a definition of terrorism that may ease the overstrained
tension in foreign affairs.
Parts IV and V will examine possible responses and the actual
counter-terrorist legislation enacted and followed by the presidential re-
sponse, in words and actions, to the legislative draft. Part VI then will
analyze the hypothetical scenario in light of these two Parts and the over-
arching proactive/reactive dichotomy.8 5
I. Terrorism-A Rebellion Without a Name
A useful definition of terrorism evolves through a three-stage pro-
cess. First, this section presents the executive and legislative branch defi-
nitions as evidence of the proactive/reactive dichotomy. Next, an
analysis of these definitions illustrates the way proactive and reactive
goals may be served through more specific definitions of terrorism. Fi-
nally, a new definition is provided that meets the Madisonian fears of an
overly powerful Executive. This definition illustrates one way to allow
congressional input on policy design, freeing the President to engage in
practical programmatic responses to terrorism.
A. The Present Definitions of Terrorism: Evidence of the Dichotomy
The search for a definition of terrorism has been likened to "the
quest for the Holy Grail: periodically eager souls set out, full of purpose,
82. Whether such justifications are self-defensive or retributive in nature is at issue. See
supra note 7. In order to take advantage of a self-defense rationale, as was argued when the
executive branch bombed Libyan and Lebanese targets, the action must fall under the author-
ity of Article 51 of the United Nations Convention. See infra notes 165-177 and accompany-
ing text; Symposium: The Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HousToN J. INT'L L. 307
(1989).
83. See supra notes 17-73, infra notes 151-201 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 31-73 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 278-311 and accompanying text.
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energy and self-confidence, to succeed where so many others before have
tried and failed."'86 Executive branch efforts have produced many defini-
tions that accentuate the proactive goal of attacking all forms of terror-
ism unconstrained by an overly specific categorization of a terrorist act.87
George Bush, in his role as head of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism, defined terrorism in terms so broad that they in-
cluded almost any political upheaval.88 The State Department has de-
scribed terrorism as "the threat or use of violence for political purposes
by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition to estab-
lished governmental authorities, when such actions are intended to
shock, stun or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate vic-
tims."8 9 A recent Defense Department publication states even more
broadly, "[t]errorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence per-
petrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandes-
tine state agents, usually to influence an audience."' The increasing
generality of the terms utilized in these definitions serve proactive goals
by allowing increased freedom of action in antiterrorism programming.
The United States statutory definition, codified in the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 91 has been characterized as "so [vague]
as to leave the entire definition almost nebulous." 92 It provides that:
International terrorism means activities that-
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that
are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
86. Levitt, supra note 5, at 97. Martin and Walcott state that "[o]ne research guide cited
109 different definitions of terrorism set forth between 1936 and 1981. The original CIA re-
search paper in 1976 had stated that 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.'"
D. MARTIN & J. WALcowr, supra note 4, at 53. This is an interesting point given the current
executive branch response to this statement. See supra note 11.
87. See generally Baker, The Western European Legal Response to Terrorism, 13 BROoK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 1 (1987) (problems arising when a definition is too broad).
88. PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 1. (The report actually states that "[t]errorism is a
phenomenon that is easier to describe than define. It is the unlawful use or threat of violence
against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to
intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or poli-
cies."). Under this definition, even the rebellion of the American colonies against England
would fall under President Bush's classification of terrorism.
89. M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 5-6 (citing Lynch, International Terrorism: The Search
for a Policy, 9 TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 8 (1987)). Celmer uses this defini-
tion to illustrate the State Department's "perception of terrorism as mainly a form of state
behavior." Id. at 6.
90. TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 2, at viii.
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter FISA].
92. Levitt, supra note 5, at 104. Levitt reasons that this poor definition is acceptable
because it was aimed only at providing grounds for electronic surveillance. "This considera-
tion did not, however, inhibit legislative drafters from using the FISA definition as a model in
later bills ... intended to have penal or foreign policy significance .... I d. at 105.
(2) appear to be intended- (A) to intimidate or coerce a ci-
vilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the conduct of a govern-
ment by assassination or kidnapping; and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend na-
tional boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accom-
plished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate,
or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
93
This definition combines reactive and proactive policy goals. The
intent element is not quite as broad as a purely proactive definition would
require. Nor are the terrorist acts specifically categorized to prevent
proactive actions as a purely reactive definition would require. This in-
ability to fit into the neat slots of the proactive/reactive model follows
from the lack of unanimity within the legislative branch. Just as all exec-
utive branch officials may not be proactive, there are many members of
the Legislature who are not reactive.94
These varied definitions have been promulgated on a common
theme: terrorism must be stopped.95 The variations may be accounted
for by the differences in the specific goals that counter-terrorism pro-
grams are to serve. The way in which we define our terms provides a
glimpse into our underlying motivations. The definitions presented
above demonstrate the proactive/reactive dichotomy. At the same time,
as explained in the following section, the definitions are tools by which
adherents to one view or the other may implement their outcome-justi-
fied programs.
B. The Proactive/Reactive Dichotomy: Use of a Definition to Meet
Policy Goals
Professor Levitt provides two goal-based approaches to defining ter-
rorism.96 The first approach describes a broad substantive, general intent
element combined with an analytical, generic type of definition.97 Proac-
tive goals fit naturally into the first framework, which allows for
93. FISA, supra note 91, § 1801(c).
94. Illustrating that not all members of Congress share reactive policy goals, Senator Or-
rin G. Hatch paints his definition of terrorism with the broadest brush yet, defining it as "bar-
barism pure and simple... wanton and willful criminal violence aimed primarily at innocent
civilians or internationally protected persons." Hatch, Fighting Back Against Terrorism:
When, Where, and How?, 13 OHfo N.U.L. REv. 5, 5 (1986).
95. Whether a common definition is possible remains unclear. At least one author has
suggested that it may not be worth the effort to define the problem. Levitt, supra note 5, at
114-15.
96. Id. at 108-09. Levitt attaches the terms inductive and deductive to describe the two
approaches. While his explanation of these terms is clearly stated, for the purposes of this
Note, the more general terms-reactive and proactive-will continue to be used. Professor
Levitt should not be held responsible for this author's extension of these terms.
97. Id.
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programmatic policies and actions relatively unconstrained by a specific
categorization of terrorist acts. The second approach utilizes a precise
substantive element, omitting intent. A definition arising from this ap-
proach consists of narrow, isolated, self-contained categories tied to-
gether in a comprehensive framework.98 The second framework is best
suited to legislation that would limit the range of presidential action.
A clear categorization of specific terrorist acts would remove the
Executive's ability to act upon its affinity for proactive programs. Before
a specific counter-terrorist action may be pursued, the precipitous terror-
ist act must mature and fit within one of the described categories. 9 1
Complicating the counter-terrorism situation, the legislative definition
cited above does not fit clearly within this second approach.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) definition"c° com-
bines the two approaches.101 The Ninety-Ninth Congress reviewed
twelve bills regarding terrorism alone.'0 2 The bill finally approved by
both Houses, the Omnibus Act, "provides U.S. criminal jurisdiction over
the killing of, or an act of physical violence with intent to cause serious
bodily injury to or that results in such injury to, a U.S. national outside
the United States."'0 3 The bill draws its intent element from the FISA.
The combined proactive/reactive approach creates greater confu-
sion than would either method alone. A proactive definition provides
for a better moral outcome as fewer terrorist acts are able to evade
reaction.' 4 A reactive definition provides better enforcement cri-
98. Id. at 109; see also Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Ba-
ses, 11 HousToN J. INT'L L. 309, 310 (1989).
99. Congress would argue that the secrecy and speed requirements of successful counter-
terrorist actions are met even with the congressional oversight. If the categories are present,
then the executive branch would be free to act with all dispatch-the dialogue having taken
place before the action was required.
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. Levitt describes this definition as a mixture of the substantive, intent, and jurisdic-
tional elements. Levitt, supra note 5, at 104.
102. Id. at 105-08.
103. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted) (citing Omnibus Act, supra note 78). It has been sug-
gested that the actual drafting of the Omnibus Act leaves much to be desired. See generally
Note, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Faulty Drafting May
Defeat Efforts to Bring Terrorists to Justice, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127 (1988).
104. Levitt, supra note 5, at 112 (the inductive [reactive] approach does not provide generic
acts which would warrant direct disapproval, thus it allows a greater number of terrorist ac-
tions to slip by its reach); see also Stephan, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against Inter-
national Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of OverseasAliens, 19 CoNN. L. REV. 831, 835 (1987)
(taking the position that overseas aliens have no constitutional rights and thus the broadest
definition possible should be attempted); Halberstam, supra note 5, at 12, 19-20 (terrorists
sh6uld be declared hostis humanis generis (enemies of all mankind) in the same way pirates
were, providing universal jurisdiction over them and their actions); see also Schachter, supra
note 98, at 311 (piracy definition does not provide adequate justification for hostile counter-
terrorism actions on foreign soil).
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teria'05 and, it has been suggested, serves as a better deterrent than would
a proactive definition. 106 The Omnibus Act does not provide a clear
standard for the definitional goal it serves. In effect, the Act illustrates
the congressional reaction to serving two masters-the legislative goal of
controlling presidential action and the stated desire of the American pub-
lic to see tangible results in the fight against terrorism. 107
Professor Levitt does not provide a basis for choosing one approach
over the other and indeed, such a choice may not be possible. 0 8 The
congressional efforts, rather than defining terrorism to yield the best re-
active policy-effect, waver somewhere along a middle ground. The non-
legislative definitions cited above exhibit no such indecision, directing
attention to clearly proactive goals. 109 Some definition of terrorism is
necessary before effective enabling legislation can be developed. The
present definitions do little to relieve the proactive/reactive dichotomy.
Professor Paust presents a process approach to defining terrorism.
This approach would provide a definition that
recognize[s] that "terrorism" involves the intentional use of vio-
lence, or the threat of violence, by a precipitator (the accused)
against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a pri-
mary target a threat of future violence, so as to coerce the primary
target through intense fear or anxiety in connection with a de-
manded political outcome.' 10
This framework falls short of fully correcting the inadequacies of
standard definitions. The "instrumental target" must be qualified as one
105. With a reactive definition, extradition treaties may be more easily directed to the
offense.
106. Levitt, supra note 5, at 112 (suggesting that specifying the act and its consequences is
of more deterrent value than would be a general statement about a generic category of actions).
107. A November 1985 poll stated the following regarding public opinion on the issue of
terrorism:
The President is seen as ultimately responsible for fighting terrorism, although the
group polled recognizes that government agencies are also involved ....
With regard to policy on terrorism, most responded that.there was no cohesive
policy, but said that there should be one ....
Under the umbrella of such a policy, Americans would still welcome actions
against terrorists that are swift, forceful and even aggressive. There is growing evi-
dence the American people support timely, well-conceived, well-executed operations
... even if inadvertent casualties result.
PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 17-18.
108. Thus the title for Levitt's article: "Is Terrorism Worth Defining?". Contra Quigley,
supra note 5, at 57 ("Some authors deny that the causes of terrorism are discernible and on
that basis argue for the preventative-punitive approach. But the causes of terrorism can read-
ily be determined.").
109. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
110. Paust, supra note 5, at 701.
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outside the role of a political actor. It is the innocent victim1 11 who has
been left relatively unprotected by existing law." 2 The international
community has always preserved the safety of diplomatic and govern-
mental representatives." 3 Professor Paust recognizes the poor choices
provided by the current United States statutory description" 4 and his
process analysis serves as a useful means of arriving at a new definition.
C. The Process Approach to a Better Definition
A definition of terrorism would ideally be of wide acceptance, "de-
scriptive and neutral,"'"I5 and at the same time, comport with established
law and structure of the Constitution." 6 Moreover, Professor Paust sug-
gests, "[ilf a proffered definition does not realistically mirror the process
of terrorism, it is likely to be overly broad, functionally unwise, and even
constitutionally unsound.""' 7 A process-oriented definition might read:
Terrorism is an intentional act of physical violence toward inno-
cent parties, manifested through kidnapping, physical injury, or re-
curring terror, designed to present a grievance to a target audience
greater than the political group with whom the actor disagrees.
The terrorist is a politically disaffected individual who views him
or herself without recourse to normal political process or access to
the population subject to that political process.
This definition allows the President to engage proactive programs
constrained by limited legislative control over reactive policy goals. The
process element, a volitional act of violence designed to present a griev-
111. A nonexhaustive list of innocent victims includes visitors to the country in which the
attack takes place, those disassociated from the policies at issue, and those who happen only to
be members of a society or country which influences the perceived problems of the terrorist.
112. Professor Paust recognizes that the United States statutory definition fails to "cover
all primary targets, such as individual civilians or groups of civilians, and [that] it needlessly
restricts types of conduct used to terrorize official elites." Paust, supra note 5, at 705.
113. Here the argument that one person's freedom fighter is another person's terrorist
comes into play. The statement is usually made to illustrate the role nonintervention should
play in United States politics. This begs the issue. The better analysis would state that so long
as the freedom fighter has chosen to attack only the political military structure of a govern-
ment, there is no innocent under fire. See supra note 11.
114. Paust, supra note 5, at 705.
115. Id. at 700-01.
116. The Stephan article, as noted above, states that the United States is not bound to treat
foreign nationals abroad with constitutional due process guarantees. Stephan, supra note 104,
at 835. This idea, combined with a hostis humanis generis treatment of terrorists, serves to
remove this last requirement. See Halberstam, supra note 5, at 15. Contra, Paust, supra note
5, at 721-35. Specifically, Paust worries that Stephan's guidelines would legitimize torture and
that a president operating under such a belief would subvert the spirit of the Constitution
"under the guise of 'national security,' 'foreign affairs,' or anti-terrorism." Id. at 728. Contra,
Schachter, supra note 98, at 311 ("states have no right to enter another state's territory to seize
suspected pirates. The analogy to piracy does not help to answer the problem of extraterrito-
rial enforcement measures against suspected terrorists.").
117. Paust, supra note 5, at 703.
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ance to a wide audience, captures the essence of terrorist behavior for
proactive purposes without limiting terrorist acts to a few, carefully de-
fined categories. The "recurring terror" clause, appended to the stan-
dard categories of kidnapping and physical injury, makes it possible to
justify counter-terrorism actions in terms of self-defense."1 '
The two parts of this definition-terrorism and terrorist-address
the reactive desire to limit antiterrorism programs to narrow categoriza-
tions of terrorist acts. Both the terrorist and the act must be described in
the defined terms before action may be taken. Thus Congress is free to
describe certain groups or individuals as nonterrorist to constrain future
presidential action. The legislative input is relegated to setting policy,
leaving the programmatic implementation to the executive branch
counter-terrorism bureaucracy.' 19
A better definition provides only one half of the solution. The defi-
nition must also be incorporated into counter-terrorism legislation. The
Omnibus Act fails to limit Executive freedom of action by leaving open
the task of seeking an internationally accepted definition of terrorism to
the President. 120 This inability to define terrorism in a manner that al-
lows congressional control of counter-terrorism policy is exacerbated by
the traditional separation of foreign affairs power arguments. Part IV
presents a framework that may be used to analyze different counter-ter-
rorism responses in light of the separation-of-powers tension. Following
the general framework, a brief review of the literature will set the scene
for the hypothetical scenario.
IV. Potential Responses To Terrorism
A. A Temporal Framework for Response
The proactive/reactive dichotomy bears out well in the area of
United States counter-terrorism actions. Presidents Reagan and Carter
took many controversial steps in their attempts to resolve specific acts of
terrorism. 121 These acts shared a commonality of action over diplomacy.
118. A state of continuing terror arises from a string of terrorist actions. After the West
Berlin discotheque bombing in 1986, the Shultz justification for the Libya strike was that the
terrorist bombing was just one in the long history, past and future, of Libyan involvement with
terrorism. See infra note 177 (President Reagan's self-defense justification).
119. This last point will be described more fully in the recommendations discussion of Part
VI. See infra notes 308-311 and accompanying text.
120. Omnibus Act, supra note 78, § 701(b). In an example of how this definition has been
interpreted by the executive branch, Former Ambassador Oakley describes international ter-
rorism as "the premeditated use of violence against noncombatant targets for political pur-
poses, involving citizens or territory of more than one country." Oakley, International
Terrorism, 65 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 611, 611 n.1 (1986-1987).
121. These actions include President Carter's ill-fated hostage rescue attempt in 1980 and
President Reagan's shelling of Lebanon in 1983, bombing of Libya in 1986, show of force in
the Persian Gulf, and the Iran-Contra affair.
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The legislative history over the same period, however, is rife with exam-
ples of cooperative action on programs accentuating a moderate ap-
proach of words over action. 122 It appears that so long as the executive
branch acts with congressional approval 123 or within the limits of stan-
dard diplomatic or economic sanctions, Congress will grudgingly allow
the President freedom of action. Through classifying the responses into a
common framework, actual and potential counter-terrorism actions may
be compared to one another.
The temporal setting under which responses to terrorism may occur
is key to a policy analysis. The responses may be roughly divided into
those addressing terrorism before, during, and after a specific action
takes place. For analytical purposes the preterrorist act responses will be
further divided into systemic and preventative responses.' 24 These first
two response categories revolve around programs implemented before
any specific act of aggression can occur.
The systemic response attempts a solution to the problems underly-
ing terrorist activity. 25 Rather than treating the outward manifestations
of terrorism, this approach works to cure the underlying disease, halting
terrorism that would otherwise occur.
The second response option, preventative acts to terminate the po-
tential for terrorism, uses existing and novel intelligence gathering orga-
nizations to halt terrorist actions at inception, or at the latest, at the
point of staging. 126 Military actions are not necessarily the only options
in this response category. The legislative exercises in this area have em-
phasized diplomatic and economic sanctions over direct military involve-
ment. 1 27 Even so, the hypothetical scenario presented for analysis is the
122. Several examples include the Economic Summit Meeting Conference statements, the
drafting of the legislative enactments, and the increasing use of economic sanctions.
123. Regarding potential legislation, Bush siates that "[o]ne area in which there is concern
both in Congress and the Executive Branch is the issue of Congressional oversight of proposed
counterterrorist operations. It may be appropriate to pursue informal discussions... to clarify
reporting and oversight requirements in this area.... [N]o set of specific procedures would be
appropriate in all cases." PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
124. Id. at 8-10 (President Bush presents three responses to terrorism: "Managing terrorist
Incidents," long term measures of "coping with the threat," and "Alleviating the Causes of
Terrorism.") Id. The four categories used in this Note are derived through attaching a tempo-
ral aspect to these responses.
125. See generally Quigley, supra note 5.
126. This idea has been presented by the executive branch on many occasions. President
Reagan's speech set forth at the outset of this Note set the framework publicly for what had
already been presented secretly in National Security Decision Directive 138, see infra notes
178-187 and accompanying text. The Vice President's Task Force makes essentially the same
recommendations: "[a] successful deterrent strategy may require judicious employment of
military force to resolve an incident." PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
127. The idea, a variant of Professor Quigley's theory, see supra note 122, is that by refus-
ing economic interaction with states that sponsor terrorist groups, the local population will be
630
logical extreme of executive branch proactive policies favoring the con-
trol of terrorist incidents prior to their actualization.
The third potential response takes place in concurrence with the ter-
rorist incident. This option stresses the resolution of an incident without
bending to the terrorist will. Examples include hostage negotiation, 128
delaying tactics, 29 third-party arrangements, 3 ° and denying the ter-
rorists the media response they seek. 131
The fourth potential avenue of response is directed, temporally, after
the terrorist action has occurred. This is the option most often utilized in
legislative circles. The goal is to prevent terrorists from seeking state-
supported asylum. This implementation most often takes the form of
international extradition treaties, 132 economic sanctions on countries that
aid or actively sponsor terrorism,13 3 and multilateral agreements con-
demning terrorism.134
Much commentary has evolved around the first, third, and fourth
responses described above. This Note focuses on the military aspects of
the second option because it provides a meaningful transition into the
proactive/reactive dichotomy.
driven to oust the terrorists. George Shultz, stating that it was due to Soviet inaction that the
United States bombed Libyan targets in 1986, see supra note 13, took this theory a step further.
128. This option is limited by United States policy concerns. "The U.S. Government will
make no concessions to terrorists. It will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies
or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism." PUBLIC REPORT, supra
note 10, at 7. But see Bush Redefines Hostage Policy-Ready to Deal, San Francisco Chron.,
Aug. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
129. PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 9 ("Delaying tactics are used during a terrorist
incident in order to stall for time to position forces, keep the terrorists off balance, or develop
other responses ... when time is important to secure international cooperation in order to
apply economic, diplomatic, legal or military pressures.").
130. Id. ('When incidents occur overseas the host country has primary responsibility for
managing the situation.").
131. The idea is to formulate policy restricting direct press access to an ongoing terrorist
incident. The State Department has outlined possible media responses. Brenner, Terrorism
and the Media, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL. 72, 73 (Sept. 1987) ("After considerable reflection, I
believe that U.S. law and custom, our country's profound commitment to freedom of the press,
and the individual circumstances of each terrorist incident make it impractical to develop uni-
versally accepted guidelines on media's response to terrorism." The article continues, sug-
gesting that the media develop their own guidelines.). The Public Report suggests that the
"media act as their own watchdog." PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 19. Still, the potential
for limitations on press access should not be discounted too lightly. See supra note 4; infra
note 143.
132. "The United States pursues international cooperation through bilateral or multilateral
agreements with like-minded nations." PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
133. See infra notes 138, 226-227 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that even
with the heavy emphasis on economic sanctions, one of President Reagan's last acts was to
ease the restrictions on Libya. Reagan Allows Oil Firms to Return to Libya, San Francisco
Chron., Jan. 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
134. "International cooperation alone cannot eliminate terrorism, but it can complicate the
terrorists' tasks, deter their efforts and save lives." PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
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B. A Brief Look at the Literature and an Introduction to the Military
Response
13 5
Curing the systemic problems underlying terrorism is probably the
most difficult of the four responses to implement.13 6 It involves the
highly problematic decision to impose the United States political system
on problems specific to another country. The United States must justify
the normative claim that there is a greater moral imperative to solving
others' problems than allowing nature to take its course.'3 7 These policy
issues are beyond the scope of this Note. Of greater interest is the notion
that structures exist that would allow Executive intervention without the
knowledge, blessing, or refutation of the legislative branch. 138
The dangers of pursuing policy goals that impress the United States
political system onto another are manifest in the counter-terrorism area.
United States legislation presupposes the tie between state sponsorship
and terrorist activities.' 9 The practicalities involved in modem terror-
ism demand a place to plan, train, and stage the action. If the past eight
years are any indication, the problem lies not only with the terrorists, but
with the nations that provide them with all of the above factors as well as
135. For structural purposes, the options presented in subpart A, see supra notes 121-134
and accompanying text, will be taken out of sequence.
136. See PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 10 ("Terrorism is motivated by a range of real
and perceived injustices that span virtually every facet of human activity.... The issues are
complex, highly emotional and seldom amenable to outside solutions.").
137. If our political system is to be presented as the best there is, there should be some
questioning involved before imposing this system rather than blindly assuming that the natural
course of events will lead others to assume its attributes. Beyond this, there still exists the
issue of foreign populations who may not want United States intervention in their domestic
problems. A better argument could be made that when these local problems erupt into terror-
ist actions affecting United States citizens and property, there is a greater justification for inter-
vention of some sort or another.
138. The military action scenario is only one facet of this greater issue. One commentator,
Professor Paul Quigley, argues for a noninterventionalist response approach, utilizing indirect,
economic sanctions to take the place of direct intervention. Professor Quigley's argument con-
cludes that the refusal of previously granted aid is as effective as never having granted the
economic aid at all. Quigley, supra note.5, at 69.
Professor Quigley limits his "law and justice" approach to terrorism that is not state-
sponsored. Professor Quiqley defines terrorism as "the direction of violence by non-state
groups at non-military targets." Id. at 48. Tying terrorism to a lack of self-determination, he
concludes that the United States should cease economic support of Israel because economic
sanctions against South Africa "contributed to [a] reduction of terrorism." Id. at 69.
139. All official United States definitions are limited to state sponsorship as a requirement
of the self-defense justification. See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text. George Bush,
discussing the different types of terrorists, dismisses non-state-sponsored terrorists as beyond
the reach of intelligence efforts. ("Terrorists lacking state sponsorship, aid or safehaven tend
to be extremely security conscious, keeping their numbers small to avoid penetration efforts."
PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 2).
with safe haven.14
The next option, creating programs to deal with terrorist incidents
as they occur, is a necessary component of a comprehensive counter-ter-
rorism policy. 141 These programs would ideally be flexible strategies
based on an established, widely publicized policy statement. Because the
proactive/reactive dichotomy does not play a strategic role in such plan-
ning, an extended discussion of this area is unnecessary for the purposes
of this Note. 42 The controversial constitutional issue for the future is
what role the media will play in ongoing terrorist incidents. 143
The fourth option, leaving terrorists no place to hide after the at-
tack, is primarily the subject of research studying international agree-
ments and extradition treaties. Like the previous response, these are
necessary components of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.
However effective the preventative programs might be, some terrorist ac-
tions likely will slip through. This point has been the subject of much
commentary and the proactive/reactive dichotomy would add little to
the discussion. 14
The second temporal response, halting specific terrorists before their
operations may be launched, describes in theoretical terms the hypotheti-
cal first strike scenario. As stated earlier, a variety of programs could be
undertaken to achieve this policy goal. 45 Programs advocating the use
of military force on terrorist camps best illustrate the proactive/reactive
dichotomy. 146
140. In this light, any time a nation provides any level of support to terrorists, that action
could be seen as state-supported. See generally Reisman, No Man's Land: International Legal
Regulation of Coercive Responses to Protracted and Low Level Conflict, 11 HouSTON J. INT'L
L. 317 (1989).
141. Whether one holds proactive or reactive policy goals, a comprehensive counter-terror-
ism policy must have a structure capable of dealing with all stages of a terrorist action. Thus,
even if the goal is to reduce terrorism through preventative programs, programs designed to
resolve ongoing acts of terrorism, such as hostage situations, must also be included.
142. Once hostages have been taken, the options are limited to negotiation, diplomatic
pressures, or rescue. The operational differences will revolve by necessity around the options
of talking or acting.
143. Placing restrictions on the media, such as limiting the direct access to ongoing terror-
ist situations, is a possibility. See, eg., Williamson, Cutting Off the IRA's "Oxygen" -Publicity:
Attacking Civil Liberties, or Terrorism, 101 L.A. Daily Journal, Dec. 14, 1988, at 6, col. 5
(England using the Official Secrets Act to restrict direct media reporting of Irish Republican
Army members); see also sources cited supra note 4 for wartime press restrictions in the
United States (although to declare a state of war would implicate the War Powers Resolution).
144. Part V will describe the major legislative and executive efforts made along this line of
inquiry. See infra notes 202-276 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
146. One of the greatest concerns with this type of program is that bombing camps located
outside population centers will force the terrorists to shift operations into urban areas. This
concern has not been addressed in the executive branch literature except in a passing reference
that those who live next door to terrorists should expect to get hurt. See supra note 13.
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During the Reagan years, advocates of proactive policies made
clear, through statement and action, that bilateral and unilateral military
programs are viable, if remote, options in the fight against terrorism. 4 7
The importance of such beliefs lies in their unlikeliness to engender direct
challenge from the Court or Congress until such actions have taken
place. 4  Much debate has occurred, 149 yet the Legislature has placed
neither words of limitation nor approval in statutory form. This inaction
could be the deciding factor validating future presidential actions if
brought before the Supreme Court.5 0 Thus, the dichotomous views on
the goals to be served by counter-terrorism policy and the muddled con-
cept of which political branch holds the foreign affairs power combine,
determining the potential for unilateral military action. Part V will es-
tablish the legislative framework within which the hypothetical scenario
may take place.
C. Foreign Policy by Force: The Shultz Doctrine and Preemptive Self-
Defense
The President may exercise the foreign affairs power of the United
States in several different ways. These include the negotiation of trea-
147. See supra note 126; infra notes 161, 175. Governor Dukakis, in a campaign debate,
stated, "We've got to be tough on terrorism.... We have to be prepared to use military force
against terrorist base camps .... [We can give no quarter when it comes to breaking the back
of international terrorism." The Presidential Debate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1988, at A16,
col.1. This statement resolves, to some extent, the argument that the proactive point of view is
a manifestation of the Republican tenure. To the contrary, political science research tends to
show an ever-growing lack of party identification on the part of the American electorate. Thus
the candidates and parties tailor their platforms and campaigns to the lowest common denomi-
nator. Discussing this centrist trend, Neuman states:
[T]he research so far raises the strong possibility that electoral decisionmaking for
many typical voters represents essentially issueless politics....
Evaluations of the candidates' policy positions clearly do not dominate the publics'
thinking [ ]. About 68 percent of the population can articulate a general issue posi-
tion of at least one candidate which might influence their vote decision.
W.R. NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLICS: KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE, 25 (1986). S.M. Lipset states:
[John Clayton Thomas] finds that for nine out of ten industrialized nations (the sin-
gle exception is the United States), the average difference in party positions on socio-
economic issues has declined .... Thomas suggests that the American exception...
may reflect the "weakness of American parties in implementing their policy
positions."
S.M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 561 (1984); see also Lipset's
discussion of John Kenneth Galbraith, id. at 563 ("the agreement among the major political
parties as involving an acceptance of a 'broad macroeconomic, public-service and social-wel-
fare commitment,' planning, welfare and regulatory policies forming a 'consensus... of great-
est importance for those of lowest income' ").
148. Lowry v Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987), is the only time such a presidential
action has been challenged.
149. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 54-72; infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.
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ties,15 formulation of international executive agreements, 52 and finally,
a concept of more recent identification, foreign policy by force. 53 The
implementation of any exercise of this power is authorized through exec-
utive orders, 54 National Security Decision Directives,155 general policy
statements,1 56 and oral or written orders by the President to members of
the executive branch.157
The Executive historically has based foreign affairs decisions on au-
thority described by the three-part test set by Justice Jackson in Youngs-
town.1 8 Youngstown involved the seizure of steel mills by President
151. See discussion supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
152. See discussion supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
153. This concept ties in with what Professor Paust terms the Shultz doctrine. With regard
to counter-terrorism, the doctrine is described as "a highly controversial position advocating
the use of military force not only against terrorists, but also against states that support, train or
harbor terrorists." Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force
Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 711, 711 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also Symposium: The Use
of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HoUSTON J. INT'L L. 307 (1989).
154. Executive orders draw no authority from the Constitution. "An executive order is,
therefore, basically a document that the President issues and so designates." Noyes, Executive
Orders, Presidential Intent and Private Rights of Action, 59 Tx. L. R.nv. 837, 839 (1981)
(footnote omitted). "Like a federal statute, a 'proper' executive order has the force and effect
of law." Id. at 841 (footnote omitted).
155. National Security Decision Directives are documents drafted by the State Department
(National Security Counsel) and signed by the President authorizing executive branch policies
and programs.
156. The general category of presidential statements include a new form of executive com-
munication-presidential signing statements. These are used by the President to incorporate
the presidential view of congressional intent into the official record. See generally Cross, The
Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential 'Signing Statements, " 40 ADMIN. L.
REv. 209 (1988); Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of Presidential Signing
Statements, 21 GA. L. REv. 755 (1987).
157. These last three authorization expressions are perhaps the most complicated in terms
of review or checks on presidential authority. An example of this is the difficulties encoun-
tered in the attempt to establish a paper trail of authority in the Iran-Contra affair. Another
illustration may be found through a comparison of Executive Order No. 12,333 (publicly stat-
ing that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and other intelligence agencies may not engage
in assassination), with NSDD 138 (secretly establishing the formation of CIA strike teams as
part of the overall counter-terrorism effort). See infra notes 178-186 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these two documents; Exec. Order No. 12,333 update, infra notes 316-321
and accompanying text.
158. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The three criteria are:
[W]hen the President actspursuant to an express or implied authorization from Con-
gress, his authority is atits maximum ....
When the President, acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers... [,t]herefore con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes ... enable, if not invite,
measures on independent.presidential responsibility ....
When the President-takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.
Id. at 635-37.
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Truman. Truman feared that a strike anywhere in the steel industry
would halt production necessary to support the Korean war effort.
Drawing authority from past seizure cases, the Court refused to uphold
this exercise of the presidential power.1 59
Such a common-law history does not exist in the counter-terrorism
area. Thus, the lack of readily discernible constitutional authority leaves
foreign policy decisions in the second, "zone of twilight" category of Jus-
tice Jackson's three-part test.1 60 This occurs when congressional inac-
tion, passive or active, leaves the President without a legislative policy
direction in his programmatic efforts.
The President is free, in the circumstances outlined above, to act
with dispatch so long as Congress and the Constitution do not forbid the
action. In the area of counter-terrorism specifically, and any other exer-
cise of the foreign affairs power generally, the proactive/reactive dichot-
omy is heightened by the executive branch desire to exert power over
new foreign affairs areas before congressional preemption may take
place. 161
Whether or not an effective counter-terrorism policy demands a
strong presidential authority, Congress has the ability to place restric-
tions on this executive power if it so chooses.162 Unfortunately, the reac-
tive constraints on legislative decision making have prevented such
action. The constitutionality of such restrictions would be a question
ripe for judicial review if challenged by the President and then presented
to the judicial branch by a unified Congress. 163 Members of the legisla-
tive branch have raised objections to most active antiterrorism measures
taken by the President. 16  They have not, however, done so in a fashion
that would establish precedent for judicial review of presidential military
counter-terrorism efforts.
The Schultz doctrine, 65 termed here foreign policy by force, may be
associated with proactive power grabs in United States foreign affairs. In
159. Id. at 585.
160. Id. at 637.
161. It must be noted that Congress is not always so quick to usurp presidential authority
in antiterrorism policies. See S. 2335, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), copresented by Senators
Denton and Dole, Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which defined "terrorism as an act of aggres-
sion against the United States which triggers the President's authority to pursue terrorists with
deadly force, if necessary." Denton, The Role of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism in the Development of U.S. Policy Against Terrorism, 13 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 19, 24
(1986); see also, Proposed House Bill 4611, War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 219 (granting
essentially the same authorization).
162. See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339; see also discussion of the War Powers Resolution,
infra notes 241-252 and accompanying text.
163. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339.
164. See supra notes 30-72, 151-160 and accompanying text.
165. The Shultz doctrine was first presented on January 15, 1986. Paust, supra note 153, at
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a speech at the National Defense University, former Secretary of State
George Shultz stated that "[ilt is absurd to argue that international law
prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace,
from attacking them on the soil of other nations even for the purpose of
rescuing hostages, or from using force against states that support, train
and harbor terrorists or guerrillas." '166 Shultz, following the Reagan ad-
ministration agenda, justified this statement with a self-defense
rationale. 167
The international justification for military strikes in response to ter-
rorism is found in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.168 This
provides a self-defense exception to the general prohibitions against the
use of force. 169 Whether the international community will accept such a
defense is not clear. It is argued that the use of force in counter-terrorist
situations is unlawful both because the Shultz doctrine is too broad171
and because it lacks the imminent harm element usually required in
pleading a self-defense justification. 171
The probable executive branch response to the first issue is that to be
effective, "proactive" measures require general policy statements in the
same way a general definition for terrorism is necessary. 172 The second
argument is not so easily dismissed.
In many ways a self-defense rationale for actions that precede or
follow a terrorist action is not unlike the claims made by proponents of
the Battered Woman Syndrome defense. 173  Shultz, in essence, argues
166. Id. (citing 25 I.L.M. 204, 206 (Jan. 1986)).
167. Id. at 730 nn. 66-67. For political reasons, all such actions will be justified in terms of
self-defense. Retaliation solely for the sake of revenge is too difficult a concept to justify under
any interpretation of international law. However, the hostis humani generis argument, see
infra note 301 and accompanying text, may make such justifications unnecessary. See also
Schachter, supra note 98, at 311.
168. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations."). For an extended discussion of Article 51, see Reisman, supra note 140, at
319.
169. Paust, supra note 153, at 716. See also Hatch, supra note 94, at 12-13; D. MARTIN &
J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 290.
170. "It is clear that the 'Shultz doctrine' is too broad to the extent that the Secretary has
advocated an unqualified use of force against terrorists on 'the soil of other nations."' Paust,
supra note 153, at 723 (footnote omitted); see also Schachter, supra note 98, at 311-15 (basic
requirements that must be met before engaging military forces).
171. Paust, supra note 153, at 730. The four elements of a self-defense claim are a belief of
imminent danger of unlawful bodily harm, the use of a reasonable amount of force in coun-
tering the threat, that the actor was not the initial aggressor, and sometimes, that there was no
available avenue of retreat. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 391-95
(1972).
172. See supra notes 14, 96, 104 and accompanying text.
173. See generally L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). But see
Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72
VA. L. REv. 619 (1986).
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that even though time may elapse between the triggering action and the
future acts of terrorism, the United States is subjected to continuing ter-
ror, thus fulfilling the imminent harm requirement.174 There is a long
record of executive branch statements justifying preemptive or retalia-
tory strikes on continuous states of terror.175 A combination of these
statements and certain, now public, evidence 176 indicates that the State
Department is willing to take proactive measures with or without an ef-
fective claim of self-defense. 177
174. See infra note 195 (Shultz' statement alluding to the continuous nature of Libya's acts
justifying the response). Whether such a counter-terrorism defense is internationally accepta-
ble is debatable:
[N]ew corollaries have established an asymmetrical regime in which certain uses of
force by certain groups for certain purposes are legitimate even though they involve
use of coercion against the territorial integrity or political independence of another
targeted state. Conversely, coercive responses which were formally considered self-
defense are now characterized by this law-making process [United Nations Charter]
as themselves unlawful uses of force.
Reisman, supra note 140, at 322.
Still, Israel long has used such a justification for preemptive attacks. On the subject of
Israel and retaliatory attacks, see id. at 317, 328; Schachter, supra note 98, at 312, 314.
175. By this logic, the President may claim that the object of the strike had forewarning.
Examples of such proactive pronouncements include: a Carter memo stating the "need... for
a responsive, but extremely flexible, antiterrorism program... that would take into account
both the contemporary nature of the terrorist threat and the wide range of federal resources
that would have to be marshalled .... " M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 19. Senator Denton,
speaking of subcommittee hearings over a six year period that "have yielded abundant and
conclusive evidence of a network, a global unity in the sources of support, strategy, tactics, and
goals of international terrorists .... [This unity, tied to Libya, is] corroborated by the events
leading up to the April 15 airstrike." Denton, supra note 161, at 19-20. Senator Hatch states
that "[i]f we as a nation cannot act multilaterally, if we cannot act bilaterally, then we must-
and we will-act unilaterally." Hatch, supra note 94, at 13; Reagan-Public Statements, 22
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 22, 24, 41, 44, 177, 444-45, 464, 494 (Jan. 7 and 17, Feb. 6, Apr.
5, 9, and 15, 1986). Ambassador Oakley declared the "need for more offensive, active meas-
ures if the spread of terrorism is to be stopped." Oakley, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 7 (Aug. 1986).
Most recently, President Bush states: "We will [exert], if necessary, military pressure on states
which sponsor terrorism .... Terrorism, as common street crime, may never be totally eradi-
cated, but we can reduce it to a more tolerable level." Bush, TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES,
supra note 2, at iii-iv.
176. See discussion of National Security Decision Directive 138, infra notes 178-187 and
accompanying text.
177. Whether the claim of self-defense is proper, the Executive will be likely to attempt at
least this level of justification. President Reagan, for example, made the self-defense justifica-
tion for the Libya bombing quite clear:
These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter ....
Should Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks against the United States not cease,
we will take appropriate measures necessary to protect United States citizens in the
exercise of our right to self-defense.
In accordance with my desire that Congress be informed on this matter, and
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am providing this report on the em-
ployment of the United States Armed Forces. These self-defense measures were un-
dertaken pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my authority as
Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces.
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National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138) was signed
by President Reagan on April 3, 1984.178 The directive called for in-
creased covert activities and counterintelligence operations to be planned
by newly established military and CIA strike teams.179 The document
states that "'the United States government considers the practice of ter-
rorism by any person or group in any cause a threat to our national se-
curity.' ,,to The next day, President Reagan commented obliquely on
the new policy, stating only "I don't think ... that we're going to get
more militant or anything."'" A few weeks after President Reagan's
statement, administration officials leaked the news that "one of the key
elements of the policy [NSDD 138] is an effort to switch from defensive
to offensive action.""' s These officials were careful to state that the pro-
hibition that Executive Order Number 12,333183 had placed on United
States sponsored assassinations had not been lifted."84 Political rhetoric
aside, NSDD 138 is evidence of the proactive executive branch attitude
toward terrorists: to at least have the capability to engage in military
counter-terrorism actions.
The evolution of NSDD 138 is a study in the move "from the reac-
tive mode to recognition that proactive steps [were] needed."'8 5 The
Reagan years have thus been typified by the watchwords-"swift and
Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 22 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 499-500 (Apr. 16, 1986). For a discussion of the aftermath of the Libya
bombing, see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
178. M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 3.
179. Id.
180. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 157 (the preamble states that national
security emergency powers will support the presidential exercise); see also Exec. Order No.
12,636, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, § 101(a) (national security
emergency policy established by the President through the National Security Council), 24
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1523 (1988).
181. News Conference of April 4, 1984, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 8 (May 1984) (President Rea-
gan was questioned on the new policy after Secretary of State Shultz alluded to the possiblity
of increased military action).
182. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1984, at A3, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 18, 1984,
(News in Brief) at 2, col. 2.
183. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982).
184. Commentators also are careful to distinguish that the NSDD 138 authorization does
not permit killings. Perhaps euphemistically, the language utilized was in terms of "neutrali-
zation." M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 87; D. MARTIN & J. WALCoTr, supra note 4, at 156-
157. Exec. Order No. 12,333, restructuring the functions of the intelligence community, pro-
hibits assassination by "any person employed by or acting on the behalf of the United States
Government." Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982); see update on Exec. Order
No. 12,333, infra notes 317-321 and accompanying text.
185. Washington Post, Apr. 16, 1984, at A19, col. 4 (interview with former Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense, Noel C. Koch).
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effective retribution."18 6 The directive has never been utilized, 18 7 but it is
important to keep in mind the lengths to which the proactive policy
search has gone. The issue has been raised that so long as the United
States plays by legal rules, she cannot win a battle fought with those not
so constrained. 18 8  The doctrine of foreign policy by force is not one
borne of necessity so much as created out of frustration with the rules of
the game. For this reason it is important to have a measure of congres-
sional control over counter-terrorism policy.
Congressional reaction to the Shultz doctrine has been mixed.189 As
stated above, 190 it has been the lack of congressional unity that has pre-
vented any adjudication of this aspect of the separation of powers alloca-
tion.' Foreign policy by force has not been fully accepted by all
members of the executive branch either. President Bush, former Secre-
tary of Defense Weinberger, and President Reagan are on record reserv-
ing opinion on military actions as a first line of counter-terrorism
defense. 192 Yet, the executive branch has not drawn the distinction on
whether a situation dictates such action, but rather, whether the chances
of immediate success justify the risk of possible embarrassment arising
from an unsuccessful military engagement. 193
Mihtary actions against terrorist training camps and staging areas
are predicated on a clear targeting strategy. 94 For example, the shelling
186. President Reagan first used this phrase on the White House lawn on January 27, 1981:
"Let terrorists beware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy
will be one of swift and effective retribution." D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTT, supra note 4, at 43.
187. Id. at 157.
188. Id. at 124-28.
189. See supra notes 153-175 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
191. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.D.C. 1987).
192. Celmer states that both Bush and Weinberger were opposed to the implementation of
the Schultz doctrine. M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 68. President Reagan announced a similar
view at a Veteran's Day Address on November 11, 1988. 24 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
1483 (1988) ("we can all agree that we've learned one lesson: that young Americans must
never again be sent to fight and die unless we are prepared to win").
193. PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 13 ("Use of our... military forces offers an excel-
lent chance of success if a military option can be implemented... depend[ing] on timely and
refined intelligence and prompt positioning of forces ... operations which can have a severe
impact on U.S. prestige if they fail."). This leads to a secondary level concern-the potential
that even successful military counter-terrorism actions on foreign soil could lead to terrorist
activities within the continental United States. This line of reasoning follows the adage that
violence breeds violence. Without a real measure of the deterrent value of military antiter-
rorist actions, this reasoning cannot be debated. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, pt. 1, at
23, col. 2 (George Shultz, when asked "if he was not concerned that Kadafi would launch"
renewed terrorist actions in retaliation for the April 14, 1986 bombing of Libya, replied,
"[w]hat he's now doing is a continuation of what he has been doing.").
194. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTT, supra note 4, at 286; Also, President Reagan, addressing
Congress after the Libya strike, stated: "These targets were carefully chosen, both for their
direct linkage to Libyan support of terrorist activities and for the purpose of minimizing collat-
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of Lebanon, arguably to strike back at terrorists, was completed with a
minimum of efficacy and a maximum of damage and injury to the civilian
population. 195 The use of urban settings to shelter the terrorists in Leba-
non made clear targeting an impossibility. Any time civilians are killed,
the retaliatory or preemptive arguments for military strikes are lessened.
Moreover, there is the danger that out of the death of innocents will
come a new cadre of disaffected civilians with a legitimate grievance
against United States policies. 196
Another example of the limiting nature of proactive programs is the
lack of consideration given by the executive branch to the effect that
counter-terrorist programs may have on potential acts of domestic ter-
rorism. The United States has the largest open border in the world.1 97
Add to this the easy access to electrical power grid lines and oil and
chemical production and storage facilities, 19 and the concern about do-
mestic terrorism takes on a new specter. Assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
intelligence agencies could stop all incoming terrorist groups,199 there re-
mains the possibility that United States nationals will offer their services
as "terrorists for hire."'2"o Domestic terrorism resulting from military
action is raised only implicitly in the Public Report. Concern with the
eral damage and injury to innocent civilians." 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 499 (Apr. 16,
1986).
195. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 151-52.
196. For example, Celmer suggests that Khaddafi actually may have been strengthened by
the 1986 United States attack as a result of popular outrage over the direct attempt on his life.
M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 66 (emphasis added). Contra President Reagan, "Sometimes it is
said that by imposing sanctions against Colonel Qadhafi or by striking at his terrorist installa-
tions we only magnify the man's importance .... I do not agree." 22 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 491 (Apr. 14, 1986).
197. Senator Hatch provides the following statistics about the ease with which aliens can
gain illegal access to the United States. "For fiscal year 1985, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) Border Patrol apprehended the startling number of 1,262,435 illegal aliens,
94 percent of whom were encountered on the Mexican border, which is 1,950 miles long. In
the first four months of fiscal year 1986, apprehensions of illegal aliens increased more than 43
percent . . . ." Hatch, supra note 94, at 9. Hatch continues, providing the statistic that for
every person apprehended, at least one more evades the Border Patrol. Id. at 9-10.
198. "Our [domestic] vulnerability lies, ironically in the strength of our open society and
highly sophisticated infrastructure. Transportation, energy, communications, finance, industry
... rely on intricate interrelated networks." PUBLIc REPORT, supra note 10, at 6; see also
Hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: Responses to Terrorism, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) (referring to hearings earlier in the year "on our government's efforts to pro-
tect our domestic infrastructure-electric utility systems, power systems, informational sys-
tems from terrorist attack").
199. President Bush states that 23 attempts at domestic terrorism were thwarted by the
FBI in 1985. PUBLIC REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
200. A Chicago drug gang that offered its services to Libya is presently in federal prison.
Liddy, Terrorists in America: An Insider's Memo to the President, 11 OMNI MAGAZINE, 42, 44
(Jan. 1989).
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military response is the possibility of a "severe negative impact on United
States prestige if [it] fail[s]. ' 2 °1
Three points must be emphasized at the conclusion of this discus-
sion of the foreign affairs power and counter-terrorism activities. First,
the Court's use of inconsistent notions of presidential power has added to
the separation-of-powers tension designed into the political system. Sec-
ond, the cases cited above, Rossi, Dames & Moore, and Chadha, when
considered alongside the poor legislative definition of terrorism and the
uncertain political consequences of counter-terrorism policy, tend to give
the Executive greater latitude than he or she might otherwise seek. Fi-
nally, the evolution of the Shultz doctrine makes the hypothetical scena-
rio presented in Part II that much less abstract. Specific statutes and
executive counter-terrorism efforts are presented in Part V to establish
the framework of analysis for the preemptive strike scenario.
V. United States Antiterrorism Policy: The Band-Aid
Approach
A. Legislative Action
The legislative history of antiterrorism policy reflects noble efforts
hampered by at least four separate problems.2 "2 It is no wonder, faced
with the difficulties encountered in providing a definition,20 3 the political
realities,2° the Court-imposed need to preempt as much foreign policy
power as possible before the Executive may usurp the chance, and the
operational tenterhooks engendered by American citizens still held hos-
tage, that Congress has adopted such a tentative and inconsistent pro-
gram. A House sponsored report lists twenty-eight separate pieces of
legislation relating to the control of terrorism.205  As stated earlier, the
Ninety-Ninth Congress alone faced twelve separate counter-terrorism
bills.20 These proposals varied from strengthening the War Powers Res-
201. Id. More recently, President Bush has followed the Shultz lead regarding the loss of
innocent lives: "In our fight against terrorism, we are going to suffer casualties. And, as in
any conflict, the innocent suffer. Our aim is to minimize the price the American People and
other innocents pay." TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 2, at iv.
202. Senator Hatch relates an anecdote about the efficacy of congressional efforts with a
comment by Edward Hale, longtime Chaplain for the Senate. "At one point, someone asked
him, 'Do you pray for the Senators, Dr. Hale?' 'No,' he replied, 'I look at the Senators and
pray for the country.'" Hatch, supra note 35, at 1025.
203. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
205. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at XI-XII (not including the many multilateral and
bilateral agreements in force).
206. See supra note 102.
olution °7 to delegating the President free reign in terrorism-related is-
sues.2" 8 This section will present the legislation specific to counter-
terrorism and the executive powers granted or subsumed by Congress.
These statutes then will be applied in Part VI to the hypothetical scena-
rio to test the legality of preemptive military action.
The House Report divides the terrorism-related legislation into five
categories, 2°9 each of which falls within the parameters of reactive poli-
cies. 1 ° The foreign assistance, trade and financial, and treaty-imple-
menting sections are geared to address the easily recognizable
manifestations of state-supported terrorism.211 The State Department
legislation creates and delegates authority to a bureaucracy responsible
for hostage relief,212 trade sanctions, 2 3 and the ratification of interna-
tional conventions and agreements.21 4 Some proactive legislative policies
are found in the conventions on preventing aircraft seizures and protect-
ing nuclear material.215 Still, only two of the twenty-eight listed Acts
direct terrorism-specific punishments.21 6 This morass of legislation illus-
trates that Congress is generally responsive to two factors-presidential
mandates217 and the placement of issues on the political agenda by non-
governmental factors.21 8 Three specific antiterrorism acts highlight the
207. S.J. Res. 340, to amend the War Powers Resolution to establish a permanent body for
the purposes of consultation as required in section 3 under the resolution, War Powers Hear-
ing, supra note 6, at 216.
208. Text of H.R. 4611, to protect United States citizens from terrorism, id. at 219; see also
Denton, supra note 161, at 24 (S. 2335--"[i]n order to clarify the President's authority to take
action to prevent or punish terrorists").
209. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at XI-XII. These categories include foreign assistance
and related legislation, legislation granting authority to the Department of State, trade and
financial legislation, treaty-implementing legislation, and other legislation.
210. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 93 for this definition.
212. This includes educational assistance to the families of hostages (Omnibus Act, supra
note 78) and providing funds for hostage crisis and intelligence activities (Security & Develop-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 99-83, 99 Stat. 219 (1985) [hereinafter Sec. & Dev. Act]).
213. These laws authorize the President to declare economic sanctions. See, e.g., National
Emergency With Respect to Libya, Message From the President of the United States, HoUSE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 762 (letter to Congress explaining Exec. Order No. 12,543, pursuant
to 50 U.S.C. 1703 (Supp. 1990) and to See. & Dev. Act, supra note 212, § 505(c)).
214. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 125-52.
215. Id.
216. See Pub. L. No. 94-467, 90 Stat. 1997 (1976), internationally protected persons, and
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), specific to the Achille Lauro hijackers.
217. The President attempts to guide the congressional agenda in at least two counter-
terrorism situations: directing the political agenda toward a show of force, and requesting
appropriations. It is difficult for Congress to ignore either plea if that President has the ear of
the populace. See, e.g., President Proposes Legislation to Counter Terrorism, 84 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 65-66 (Apr. 1984).
218. Examples of this would include the public response to the Achille Lauro piracy, the
many airplane hijackings, and the embassy bombings.
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legislative responsiveness as it impacts the congressional ability to over-
see executive action.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961219 is the starting point for most
analyses of counter-terrorism legislation. Part Two of this Act, entitled
the International Peace and Security Act of 1961, sets forth this original
congressional intent:
In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Con-
gress to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy,
security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an
improved climate of political independence and individual liberty,
improving the ability of friendly countries and international orga-
nizations to deter, or if necessary, defeat Communist or Commu-
nist-supported aggression ....
Congress has amended this Act every year since its codification. These
amendments have run the foreign affairs spectrum, including such diver-
gent concerns as the rise of nonpeaceful uses of atomic energy221 and the
specific coordination of United States antiterrorism assistance to foreign
countries.222 The Security and Development Act of 1985 amended the
Foreign Assistance Act, adding, among other sections, Title V-Interna-
tional Terrorism and Foreign Airport Security.223
The 1985 Act served the following functions: granting appropria-
tions for the new assistance program;22 4 making the Secretary of State
"responsible for coordinating all antiterrorism assistance"; 225 granting
the presidential authority to deny economic assistance and import al-
lowances to countries supporting terrorism; 226 singling out Libya with a
ban on imports and exports;227 and calling on all civilized nations to con-
demn state terrorism.228
Along with these administrative functions, the 1985 Act granted the
President the authority to "seek the establishment of an international
committee... to focus the attention and secure the cooperation of the
governments and the public of the participating countries ...on the
problems and responses to international terrorism. ' 229 Section 507 di-
rected the President to seek a process to reach international agreement
219. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2429 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
220. § 502, 107 CONG. REC. 17,832 (Aug.31, 1961). This point of view may not have
changed so greatly over the years. See statement of Sen. Denton, supra note 161.
221. 108 CONG. REc. 13,439 (amending Part I, § 101).
222. 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7 (Supp. IV 1986).
223. Codified as Part VIII, Anti-Terrorism Assistance, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa-2349aa-9
(Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter 1985 Act].
224. Id. § 2349aa-4.
225. Id. § 2349aa-7.
226. Id. §§ 2349aa-9, 2371.
227. Id. § 2349aa-8.
228. 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws: LAWS (99 Stat.) 222.
229. Id.
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on a treaty which would "prevent and respond to terrorist acts. 230
The Foreign Assistance Act and its progeny were implemented
through a series of Executive Orders culminating in Executive Order
Number 12,608.231 A glimpse at the number of implementing orders
since 1961 provides insight into the congressional desire to create an om-
nibus act to simplify the administration of the counter-terrorism laws.
The Diplomatic Security section of the Omnibus Act (Title I) is
designed "as a response to the new and profoundly difficult security-re-
lated challenges confronting United States Government personnel and
missions abroad. 2 32 Title V is "intended to enhance the Department of
State's ability to deal with the growing threat of international terror-
ism." '233 These provisions establish such things as an international ter-
rorists most wanted list23a and a reward authorization for information on
terrorists and international drug traffickers.235 Title VII reinforces the
language in the 1985 Act, delegating the search for an international
agreement on counter-terrorism to the President.23 6 The omnibus style
of the Act is admirable but, at the same time, it has been suggested that
the drafting efforts actually leave much to be desired.237 The combina-
tion of new and old antiterrorism programs 238 did little to correct the
ambiguous delegations and lack of any functional definition.2 39 There is
also little oversight legislation directed at limiting the President's ability
230. Id. These last two points will become crucial in the analysis of the hypothetical situa-
tion as evidence of congressional over-delegation. See infra notes 286-289 and accompanying
text.
231. 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617 (Sept. 14, 1987).
232. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS: LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 1872. A better
statement, given the twelve bills presented for consideration that session, would claim that the
one thing Congress could agree on was that the embassy bombings indicated the need for
greater security measures.
233. Id. at 1886. This statement illustrates the congressional willingness to delegate work-
ing control to the executive branch.
234. Id.; see, ag., TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra note 2.
235. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS: LAWS (100 Stat.) 869.
236. Id. at 878.
237. Note, supra note 103, at 145 ("the Antiterrorism Act as enacted probably will not
succeed in obtaining the extradition and prosecution of terrorists who attack U.S. nationals
abroad").
238. These include cash benefits for hostages and their families, increased maritime and
nuclear security, a fellowship program to increase the number of individuals able to under-
stand Eastern European and Soviet culture and language, and even a request that the United
Nations deny former Secretary General Waldheim his pension. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws: LAWs (100 Stat.) 801-08, 901-13, 1001-5, 1303.
239. The Omnibus Act, supra note 78, renews the congressional call for the encouragement
of a criminal punishment convention to provide "an explicit definition of conduct constituting
terrorism." 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS: LAWS (100 Stat.) 895-96. The United
Nations has approved several definitions of terrorism over the years, but the United States has
yet to agree. Levitt, International Counterterrorism Cooperation: The Summit Seven and Air
Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1987).
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to launch proactive programs such as that suggested by the preemptive
strike hypothetical scenario. Some argue that the War Powers Resolu-
tion inserts such congressional input and guarantees eventual control
over exercises of presidential power. Given the Resolution and the les-
sons learned from Lowry v. Reagan,2' this point is subject to a great deal
of debate.
The War Powers Resolution Act of 1973, passed in response to the
Vietnam War and Watergate scandal,24 intended to limit the power of
the Executive to engage United States forces in prolonged military con-
fticts.242 Section Three "require[s] the President to consult Congress in
every possible instance before engaging in hostilities, actual or poten-
tial.' 24 3 This consultation provision, along with the ninety day time limit
after which congressional authorization becomes mandatory,2" is in di-
rect conflict with any implied power of the Executive to commit United
States forces.245 Although the War Powers Resolution was directed to-
ward conventional warfare, the Chairman of the House Committee of
Foreign Affairs "rejected the idea that it somehow fell outside the law or
obviated the need to consult with Congress as the policymaking branch
of the Federal Government" in counter-terrorism situations.246
Since its passage, every president has criticized the War Powers Res-
olution on constitutional grounds.247 Abraham Sofaer, State Depart-
ment legal advisor, claimed that "the manner of complying with the
[consultation] requirement [is] largely to be determined by the Presi-
dent. '24 ' He continued, "the threat of a possible hostile response is not
sufficient to trigger the consultation requirement .... ,1249 The executive
branch does not view preemptive military counter-terrorism actions as
falling under the purview of either Congress or the War Powers Resolu-
240. 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
241. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 96.
242. War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 94-95.
243. Id. at 155 (summary statement of Archibald Cox).
244. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
245. Abraham D. Sofaer, legal advisor, Department of State, notes that "the President has
independent powers in the area [of engagement in hostilities] ... supplemented by statutory
grants of authority such as a provision in the 1986 DOD [Department of Defense] Authoriza-
tion Act that states the Government's duty to safeguard U.S. citizens against terrorism." War
Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 98. Note the distinction between DOD powers and CIA
powers made in the reinterpretation of Exec. Order No. 12,333, infra notes 317-321 and ac-
companying text.
246. War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 94. J. Brian Atwood noted that "members of
Congress... have infinitely more experience in dealing with military and foreign affairs than
White House functionaries." Id. at 102.
247. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. at 336 n.20.
248. War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 95-96. ("Moreover, since the law called for
consultation 'in every possible instance ... consultation in a particular case will depend on the
prevailing circumstances."' Id. at 96 (emphasis added)).
249. Id. at 97.
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tion.2 50 Thus, even though there has been congressional discussion and
action over this facet of the battle of the foreign affairs power, the issue is
far from settled.21 As presented in the Part IV, if Congress is to test the
constitutionality of the Resolution, it must do so by joint action requiring
presidential compliance.25 2
It is important to note the chronology of the War Powers Hearings
cited above to the passage of the Omnibus Act. The hearings took place
in April and May of 1986, arising out of the Libya bombing of April 14.
Yet, although both Houses passed the Omnibus Act on August 12,
1986,23 there is no mention of a heightened reporting standard for mili-
tary counter-terrorism actions. Title III establishes a performance and
accountability review board, but this functions primarily to review secur-
ity failures at diplomatic missions.254 The Omnibus Act includes several
reporting requirements, but these are designed more to give Congress an
update on the implementation of the Act than to review or limit the au-
thorities granted the President.255
B. The Executive Record
The foreign affairs section presented the administrative options for
executive action, both through legislative mandate and inherent presiden-
tial authority.25 6 The House Report lists fifteen separate executive branch
documents implementing antiterrorism legislation from 1977 to 1986.257
Another facet of executive branch activity is the Economic Summit Con-
ference Statements. 258 These conferences began as an attempt to further
economic cooperation between the several countries,259 but soon evolved
into "a tradition of gathering every year to discuss issues of mutual con-
cern. ' '260 The first joint statement on international terrorism was issued
on July 17, 1978, at the Bonn Summit.261 Each succeeding summit con-
ference has issued some sort of continuing message on the original Bonn
250. The War Powers Resolution has never been offically invoked by joint resolution of
Congress. Had it been, there is the possibility the judicial branch would have been involved
and much of this discussion would be moot.
251. Sofaer "questioned the application of the War Powers Resolution to ... self-defense
activities to preempt and deter unlawful agression by means of state-sponsored terrorism."
War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 98.
252. Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339.
253. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEws: LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 1865.
254. 22 U.S.C. § 4831 (Supp. IV 1986).
255. Id. at §§ 705, 913, 1103.
256. See supra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
257. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at XII.
258. Id. at 199-207.
259. Participants include Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
260. Levitt, supra note 239, at 264.
261. International Terrorism, 78 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2018, at 5 (1978).
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Declaration.26 2 One commentator summarized the effect of the Summit
Statements as follows: "the real world is probably not going to fit very
comfortably into the simple model of 'refus[ing] extradition or prosecu-
tion' envisioned in the words of the Bonn Declaration... [T]o implement
it meaningfully, a decision-making process capable of assessing complex
legal and factual variables ... and acting on them, must exist. 263
The House Report also lists bilateral agreements on aviation security
to which the United States is a party.2 4 Yet the most crucial element of
presidential counter-terrorism programs is not the authorization and de-
velopment of policy, but the implementation process itself. Because the
NSC and CIA lead the present bureaucracy, there is virtually no nonex-
ecutive branch representation in the decision making and policy guidance
of day-to-day United States antiterrorism efforts. 265 This results from a
series of executive steps delimiting a working task force to design
counter-terrorism policy and programs.
On October 2, 1972, the Nixon/Ford Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism met for the first and last time.266 The committee's stated pur-
pose was "to prevent and respond swiftly to international terrorism. "267
After this date, a small working group performed the tasks of the larger
organization. The lack of any interdepartmental intelligence cooperation
and an equal lack of cooperation between the members themselves com-
plicated the group's efforts. 268 President Carter restructured the anti-ter-
rorist bureaucraey 269 under the auspices of the National Security Council
in September 1977.270 Carter hoped to avoid the problems that faced the
predecessor committee by keeping the decision making functions at the
highest committee level.
The inability of these top officials to understand the degree of fanati-
cism underlying terrorist actions led President Reagan to once again al-
ter the bureaucratic structure.27 1 The Interdepartmental Group on
262. Levitt, supra note 239, at 265-71.
263. Id. at 287. On the matter of such conventions, Ambassador Oakley stated: "[They]
are important because of the moral force they offer. Their effectiveness is limited, however, by
the willingness or ability of states to enforce them.... [O]btaining a country's ratification of a
convention or treaty is one thing. Obtaining adherence is something else." M. CELMER, supra
note 5, at 105-06 (citing Oakley, Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, Aftermath of the Achille Lauro Incident 17 (Oct. 30, 1985)).
264. House REPORT, supra note 6, at XII-XIII (the comparable multilateral treaties are
also presented).
265. M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 17-62.
266. Id. at 17.
267. Id. (citing 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 475-80 (Oct. 23, 1972)).
268. Id. at 18.
269. Id. at 19 (Carter Memo).
270. The Special Coordination Committee was formed, chaired by the National Security
Adviser and staffed by the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Direc-
tor of the C.I.A., and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. M. CELMER, supra note 5, at 19.
271. Id. at 114.
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Terrorism was streamlined to facilitate the new proactive policies.272
The changes kept identical feedback mechanisms in place, but instead of
filtering through the Cabinet Committee, information travels directly to
the President through the National Security Council and the Secretary of
State.273 Finally, NSDD 207, in January 1986, authorized the Opera-
tions Sub-Group, prepositioning troops in Europe to cut down on
counter-terrorist response time.274 This directive grants State Depart-
ment authority over all counter-terrorism efforts overseas.275
These legislative and executive branch actions define the parameters
of potential action. When viewed in the context of the general foreign
affairs powers,276 these separate processes combine to create the frame-
work for an analysis of the potential reach of presidential counter-terror-
ism powers.
VI. The Preemptive Military Strike Scenario277
A. Is Foreign Policy by Force a Counter-Terrorism Option?
The proactive/reactive dichotomy is the logical outcome of the his-
tory of antiterrorism efforts, 27 the political demands for a success, 279 and
the conflicting ideas of who should hold the reins of such policies.280
This dichotomous relationship is borne out through the definitions
presented by both the executive and the legislative branches. 281 The lack
of constitutional direction on the foreign affairs power exacerbates the
normal, healthy tensions imposed on the United States government by
the separation-of-powers doctrine.28 2  Absent unambiguous congres-
sional language, the Court will allow the executive branch to seize and
hold the counter-terrorism aspect of this power.283 The legislative his-
tory presented suggests that the political realities oppose the united front
272. Id. at 23 (NSDD 30 was the instrument of this change).
273. See generally id. at 29-61 for a description of the Reagan antiterrorism bureaucracy.
The impact of this restructuring was felt most strongly in the Iran-Contra affair. See supra
note 164.
274. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 322. This tends to cast doubt on the
claim that NSDD 138 will never be implemented. See also Marlowe, U.S., French Navies
Practice Hostage Rescue, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 13, 1989, at A13, col. 2.
275. D. MARTIN & J. WALCoTr, supra note 4, at 322.
276. As they have been described by constitutional provision and Supreme Court prece-
dent, see supra notes 17-72 and accompanying text.
277. The reader will benefit by referring to the hypothetical scenario on this point, supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 96-114, 203-256 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 30-72, 151-160 and accompanying text.
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that the Court would demand before accepting jurisdiction.28 4 And fi-
nally, recent executive branch actions lead to the conclusion that un-
checked, the Shultz doctrine, modified by a cost/benefit analysis of the
potential for embarrassment, is becoming a more viable option.285
B. How Viable Is the Scenario?
Unilateral military action is most viable under a state of constant
terror. The level of terrorist activities aimed at United States citizens has
decreased on a percentage basis over the past few years.2 86 Any single
incident, however, may engender higher levels of concern than might be
expected from the isolated severity of that case. Indeed, once the deci-
sion has been made that military action is viable, the level of terror may
be artificially manipulated through a skillful use of the media and polit-
2817ical processes.
The Executive's desire to pursue the use of force has already been
presented.288 *There are three ingredients necessary to a successful mili-
tary action. The first is a good source of intelligence data to track terror-
ist movements, gather evidence of upcoming or prior terrorist actions,
and finally, to stage and carry off the counter-terrorist engagement. Se-
crecy at this point is of preeminent importance to preserving the safety
and reliability of these information sources. Secondly, it requires a strike
force pre-positioned, trained, and equipped to carry out the action. Last,
the cooperation of allies in the common goal of eliminating this aspect of
the international problem is necessary.289
C. Discussion
The hypothetical scenario presented in Part II raises three issues for
discussion and analysis. The first is whether the President's message to
Congress serves as notification or consultation as required in the War
Powers Resolution.290 This implicates a related issue-whether the con-
284. This is not to suggest that the Court is the proper forum for the resolution of such
questions. If the argument presented in this Note is to be consistent, it is through a strong
presidential power of action, constrained by congressional policy control, that such disputes
will be avoided. The judicial option should be withheld as an option of last resort.
285. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
286. "From 1986-1987, the number of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks dropped 25 percent. In-
ternational terrorist operations in Western Europe over the past 2 years decreased 31 percent,
and last year in Latin America dropped by 32 percent." TERRORIST GROUP PROFILES, supra
note 2, at iii.
287. President Reagan used such a strategy in early 1984 by declaring a State of Emer-
gency, supra notes 175, 194, then utilizing a series of speeches and press conferences to point
the finger at Libya for the acts of terrorism preliminary to the U.S. airstrike on April 14.
288. See supra notes 175, 178-188, 201, 206 and accompanying text.
289. See generally NSDD 207, supra note 274 and accompanying text for these three
points.
290. See supra note 177 (Reagan's statement on the scope of the reporting requirement).
sultation provision governs such actions. The second issue is whether a
self-defense justification for the exercise may be deduced from President
Bush's fear of an imminent attack on United States soil. The third issue
involves the unilateral nature of the military action. The preceding dis-
cussion serves to enhance the analysis of these issues.
Before the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution
may be called into play, it must be demonstrated that there is more sup-
porting a military counter-terrorism response than inherent presidential
power.2 91 The legislative record regarding antiterrorism is one of ab-
stract delegation. Commentators state that an effective policy requires a
better definition of terms. Yet Congress, rather than defining terrorism
in terms that would effectuate a better United States antiterrorism policy,
has granted a broad mandate to the President to seek out a process by
which an internationally accepted definition could be reached.292 Of per-
haps more importance to the delegation issue, Congress also has author-
ized the President "to strengthen, where necessary, through bilateral and
multi-lateral efforts, the effectiveness of such sanctions [for the seizure of
maritime vessels by terrorists]."2 93
Since Congress has not limited the presidential mandate to seek a
definition for terrorism, the Executive is left free to posit a hostis humani
generis definition,2 94 then to extend this piracy-limited delegation to all
acts of terrorism. While perhaps broader than the congressional intent,
the increased delegation is well within the standards set by the Court for
legislative interpretation. 295 Thus, the last possible avenue of legislative
control over executive action must lie with an expansive reading of the
War Powers Resolution.
Assuming the War Powers Resolution is to be called into play, it
must be decided whether the reporting requirements are triggered by an
isolated engagement 296 and whether the Resolution applies at all to situa-
tions of self-defense.297
Exactly when the reporting requirements of the War Powers Reso-
lution are triggered, and by what type of action, are issues that Congress
will have to determine by joint resolution before it may again be brought
291. See supra note 245 (generally, the action must be described as more than naked self-
defense before the executive branch will find the War Powers Resolution Act reporting re-,
quirements triggered.).
292. Sec. & Dev. Act, supra note 212; Omnibus Act, supra note 78.
293. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS: LAWS (100 Stat.) 892.
294. See supra notes 104, 116 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (ambiguous delegations will be given
their broadest meaning to avoid international confusion). There is no evidence of the intent
underlying this section in the legislative history. The section was drafted in response to the
Achille Lauro piracy, thus the case could be made that the delegation is meant to include all
such "terrorist" situations.
296. Id.
297. War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 98 (statement of Mr. Sofaer).
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before the judicial branch.298 A presidential decision to treat the Resolu-
tion as requiring simple "reporting" and not consultation may be based
on either the self-defense doctrine or emergency powers. Given that it
has been over one hundred years since the Court has restrained "the con-
duct of presidentially authorized military activities," 299 even if Congress
were to show unanimity in applying the War Powers Resolution, it is not
clear on which side the Court would resolve the issue.3"°
The second concern raised is the self-defense justification. This
brings the provisions of the United Nations Charter under consideration.
If the imminent danger argument30 1 is utilized, the Article 51 language
suggests that such military actions are not to be considered "against the
territorial integrity or the political independence of any State., 30 2 An
action of self-defense, if "swift and effective" in its implementation, does
not seem to fall within the concerns which led to the War Powers Reso-
lution.30 3  This last issue also is likely to be raised in justification for
pursuing unilateral action, rather than a joint effort.
In the hypothetical scenario, President Bush sets forth two reasons
for pursuing the military option alone. In the Libya raid, the United
States European allies were given more notice of the planned operation
than was Congress.30°  Yet, only the United Kingdom would give the
necessary landing and refueling permission to stage the bombing. 30 The
second example concerns the United States belief in early 1989 that the
Libyans were in the last stages of constructing a chemical weapons plant.
The European response to this, specifically at the Paris Conference on
Chemical Weapons, ran anywhere from disbelief to ridicule.3 6 The ex-
298. See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339.
299. Comment, supra note 17, at 193 (footnote omitted). The last time the Court re-
strained such presidential action was in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
300. Indeed, given the abstract and ambiguous delegations in counter-terrorism legislation,
it is likely that the Court would support the executive actions over congressional disapproval.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
302. Halberstam, supra note 5, at 17 (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4)); the article 51
provision states "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." Id. (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 51). See
also Reisman, supra note 140, at 319.
303. The history of the War Powers Resolution dealt with prolonged military engagements
without congressional oversight. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
304. War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at 101 (Statement of Mr. Atwood).
305. D. MARTIN & J. WALCOTr, supra note 4, at 312 ("Not only had she [Margaret
Thatcher] not given a blank check, she had quietly told the Reagan administration not to ask
again.").
306. The story of the Libyan chemical weapons plant is an interesting one. Secretary of
State Shultz arrived at the Paris conference with evidence of the Libyan plant in hand.
Although Britain, Canada, Egypt, and France initially agreed that the plant "could" be used
to produce chemical weapons, they withheld support on the actual claim. West Germany,
accused of supplying equipment and expertise, flatly denied the United States allegations. Tel-
ephone intercepts, which had led the United States to suspect the purposes to which the plant
ecutive branch argument would be that the consultation necessary to
launch successful counter-terrorism military actions, whether consulting
with Congress or United States allies, is only as good as the actions
which stand behind the words of the agreement.
30 7
This discussion illustrates that the President's powers in the area of
counter-terrorism arguably include the ability to engage in a preemptive
military action without the advice or consent of Congress. Such proac-
tive programs, regardless of their efficacy, may be a danger to both the
separation-of-powers and to the general public interest. The final ques-
tion is how to design a system which allows for proactive programs
which meet the more reactive and reflective policy concerns of the
Legislature.
D. Recommendations
The claim presented at the outset of this Note was that the President
should control the administration of counter-terrorism policy. The speed
and secrecy requirements of effective antiterrorism programs, whether
proactive or reactive, demand a sole representative of the United States
sovereignty. The counter-terrorist bureaucracy, controlled by the Na-
tional Security Counsel, is an administrative group, which is better over-
seen by a single individual. Congress, like a corporate board of directors,
should be responsible for the development of policy, addressing the long-
range concerns of the general polity. The President, as chief executive
officer, should be responsible for the implementation of those policy
goals. Rather than concentrating on the War Powers Resolution's con-
sultation requirement,308 Congress could better spend its time seeking a
definition of terrorism that would allow a more limited proactive policy
than that presented by the executive branch.30 9
would be put, were then supplied to the West German authorities. Within a week, the first
arrest, of a Belgian shipping agent, was made. See Chicago Tribune, Jan. 8, 1989, at C21, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. I; N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
307. Discussing the Summit Conference Statements, Professor Levitt states "when it comes
to a problem as sensitive and complex as international counterterrorism-making declarations
is one thing; carrying them out is a far more difficult matter." Levitt, supra note 239, at 287.
Earlier he states, "[y]et behind all the rhetoric, the actual record of attempts to give substance
to the ideal of international cooperation against terrorism is, as even a casual observer will
readily apprehend, rather dismal." Id. at 261. On the related issue of consultation with Con-
gress, Mr. Atwood raised three factors "to motivate administrations to avoid consultation and
reporting." First, "fear that presidential powers would be lost." Second, "a threat to a 'care-
ful balancing of competing options.'" And third, "widening to a dangerous extent the number
of people who know about a sensitive operation." War Powers Hearing, supra note 6, at'101.
308. See supra notes 243-252 and accompanying text.
309. The definition presented in Part III serves this purpose. See supra notes 115-120 and
accompanying text.
Spring 19901 COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Congress should take a more active role in overseeing the counter-
terrorism bureaucracy. The time and secrecy constraints on successful
antiterrorism actions present a lesser concern in the planning and devel-
opment phases. It is here that a small congressional working team, com-
posed of members of both Houses, could make the greatest practical
difference if limiting proactive policies is to be the substantive goal. The
implementation authority should be left to the President and the Secre-
tary of State.310 The new congressional team ideally would be added to
the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.311 This would allow for the
rapid implementation of counter-terrorism programs, designed by both
the unofficial congressional representatives and the existing executive
branch bureaucracy.
The hypothetical scenario was presented to illustrate the dangers in-
herent to the current state of the foreign affairs power. The Court is
correct to force the two political branches to work out their relative
shares of this power. However, the separation-of-powers tension is now
in an unnatural state of unrest. The Court's inconsistent applications of
theories of presidential power have served as a catalyst for the change
from a basic difference in policy goals to the present proactive/reactive
dichotomy.
VII. Conclusion
The proactive/reactive dichotomy implies a tension greater than the
normal political process envisioned by the Framers. This seemingly in-
solvable state of affairs arose partly out of the separation-of-powers in
foreign affairs and partly out of Court pronouncements stretching the
tenuous band bridging that vacuum. This dichotomy has so separated
executive and legislative policy goals, that, at least with respect to
counter-terrorism policy, the foreign affairs power is up for grabs. The
question, then, is how to remove these impediments and return to the
healthy tension envisioned to check the powers of the political branches.
The easy answer to this quandary is for Congress to pass laws re-
stricting presidential authority. If then challenged by an executive act,
the issue would be ripe for review. Yet it is the nature of terrorism that a
single representative is more likely to be heard than an amorphous
group. The more difficult option was presented at the conclusion of Part
310. See supra note 123 (President Bush's statement on the subject of congressional
oversight).
311. See supra note 273. It is important to note that the legislative members of the com-
mittee would be limited in their ability to halt actions they found improper. The only way to
make the position less than that of a figurehead is to assure that the President and Secretary of
State would be constrained by the paper record of such a committee. If action contrary to the
advice of the working group were to be taken, this would have to be justified at a later date and
alone should serve to restrain the executive behavior.
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VI. The insertion of an unofficial congressional working group into the
executive branch antiterrorism bureaucracy would go a long way toward
balancing the consultation interests of Congress with the programmatic
power concerns of the executive branch.
As with every simple solution to a complex question, this one is
fraught with pitfalls. President Bush has made clear his opposition to the
broad consultation requirements of Congress,312 and the members of
Congress have made clear their intentions to press the issue whenever it
arises.3 13 It will always be the case that the President is held responsible,
even if hobbled by restrictive legislation. The fact that a preemptive
counter-terrorist strike is posed as a viable option suggests that perhaps
these pitfalls should not be made into insurmountable obstacles.
To return to the elephant and the flea metaphor, discretion and tim-
ing will determine the efficacy of a given use of power. With Congress
serving to preserve discretion and the President executing timing, raw
abuses of power may be better avoided.
VUT. Addendum: The Bush Presidency-A New Chapter
In the brief period between this Note's drafting and its publication,
several applications of the Shultz doctrine have arisen. The purpose of
this Part is to update the reader on the executive trend. For this reason,
these examples will be raised by way of comment rather than intensive
interpretation.
The doctrine of foreign policy by force was limited to the form of
terrorism defined in subpart III(C). 14 Over the past year, the antiterror-
ism powers of the Executive have been extended in a novel fashion. The
worldwide drug problem has been defined in terms of narco-terrorism 31 5
and the Bush administration has extended the counter-terrorism battle in
three directions. First, the ban on intelligence agency assassination
assistance has been called into question. Second, United States military
aid has been extended in the transformation of political systems into
United States-type systems under the guise of narco-terrorism-related
aid. And finally, the use of force has been posited to aid in the deterrence
of drug trafficking.
Executive Order Number 12,333 limits the ability of the United
States intelligence agencies to aid in political actions that may result in
the assassination of foreign political leaders.316 In the wake of the failed
Panamanian coup of October 3, 1989, the Department of Defense called
312. See supra note 123.
313. See supra notes 242-243, 246 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
315. The extension of drug trafficking to terrorism was codified in the Omnibus Act, supra
note 78, §§ 502, 503; see supra note 235 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 157, 178-186 and accompanying text.
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for a reinterpretation of the executive order.3" 7 The Bush administration
stated that "[tlhere are interpretations and discussions and understand-
ings... with the Hill that should be reconsidered in light of their impact
on coup activities.... We do not plan to revise the prohibition on assas-
sination." '318 Then, providing a mixed message on October 30, 1989, the
Pentagon was "expected to approve a definition... permit[ting] military
special forces units to kill terrorists," '319 and on November 29, William
Webster, CIA director, stated "[tlhe agency has no desire to see that
prohibition on assassination changed, rescinded or modified ... we in-
tend to comply with it."3z Apparently, the intelligence community will
continue to be restricted while the defense community may not. Given
the language of NSDD 138,321 this seems at first glance to support the
potential for increased covert military action in antiterrorism programs.
The second evolution in foreign policy by force falls into the cate-
gory of antiterrorism efforts through direct military intervention. The
United States aid to the successful Panamanian coup on December 20,
1989, is relevant to this discussion in three ways. First, the reasons given
for the military action itself fall into the foreign policy by force discus-
sion presented above. Second, the proactive/reactive dichotomy is evi-
denced through the congressional reaction. And third, the action itself
may be tied to potential antiterrorism activities reflectectin the hypotheti-
cal scenario.
The reasons provided for the invasion by Secretary of State Baker,
were "that the United States incursion had been made to assist a demo-
cratically elected government," and that "[President] Bush had acted to
317. See Sen. Williams, Defense Briefing, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Oct. 17, 1989) (Wil-
liams, in the briefing, states that the Army is attempting "to define the term 'assassination' ...
primarily for use in the planned 1991 republication of the Army 'Law of War Field Man-
ual.' "). Note that on September 18, 1989, an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times, written
by Senator J. Lieberman, called for a rescission of the Executive Order itself. Lieberman,
Reissue a License to Kill; In this War, Lives of Narco-Terrorists Must be at Stake, Too, L.A.
Times, Sept. 18, 1989, pt. 2, at 5, col. 3.
318. Gertz, Bush Seeks to Ease Restrictions on CIA, Washington Times, Oct. 18, 1989, at
A6, col. 1.
319. Gertz, Interpretation of Assassination Ban Under Study, Washington Times, Oct. 30,
1989, at A3, col. 1. Gertz also states:
Mr. Bush told a group of Republican Senators two weeks ago that restrictions on
assassinations agreed to by the Reagan administration and left unchanged by the
Bush administration hamper U.S. foreign policy because they would have forced the
United States to warn Gen. Noriega of the coup or even protect him from being
overthrown.
Id.
320. Webster, National Press Club Luncheon Speaker, National Press Club Ballroom (Nov.
29, 1989).
321. See supra notes 178-188 and accompanying text; see also NSDD 207, supra notes 274-
275 (granting State Department control over all counter-terrorism efforts overseas).
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restore democracy." '322 However, there exists evidence that there were
other reasons for the United States intervention.323 Given the history of
Noriega's purported involvement with the drug trade, supported by the
federal charges for his arrest, a major reason may be tied to the issue of
narco-terrorism. Also to be noted is that President Bush has held true to
his statements regarding the use of force; that it is not the success or
failure of the effort so much as the potential for embarrassment that will
guide his actions.324
The congressional reaction to the intervention follows the same ba-
sic pattern as that following the bombing of Libya.325 At first, the reac-
tion was guarded, but with the rapid pace of events toward a quick
resolution and the surge in popular support, Congress showed an over-
whelming approval of the invasion.326 Rather than illustrating a trend
toward a more proactive legislature, this approval appears to be evidence
of the general centrist trend in United States politics.3 27
Finally, the invasion provides empirical support for the hypothetical
scenario analyzed in this Note.328 Granted the extension from the defini-
tion of terrorist 329 to narco-terrorist activities, the next logical step is to
use the counter-terrorist bureaucracy to remedy the drug problem.330
The invasion may be seen as an example of the paternalistic concerns
raised by the United States imposing its political system onto that of
322. Apple, Bush's Turn to Wield the Big Stick, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 21, 1989, at
A14, col. I.
323. Id. (pointing out that "there has not been a democratic government in Panama, and
Endara had not functioned for a single hour as the country's head of state"); see also Viviano,
U.S. Policymakers Split on Noriega For Many Years, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 22, 1989, at
A18, col. 1.
324. See, eg., Nelson, Bush Insisted on Full-Scale Battle Plan, San Francisco Chron., Dec.
21, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
325. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Liebert, Congress Quickly Falls in Behind Bush on Panama Decision, San
Francisco Chron., Dec. 21, 1989, at Al1, col. I (statements of congressional leaders in support
and opposition).
327. See supra note 147. But see Liebert, Congress Quickly Falls in Behind Bush on Pan-
ama Decision, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 21, 1989, at A11, col. 1 (suggesting that the reason
for the support was simple embarrassment, Dole states, "Remember, he [Bush] was called
'timid'--he didn't do what he should have done, he didn't go after Noriega [on Oct. 3],... and
it's going to be hard for those Democrats, whose quotes are available, now to say anything but,
'The President's done the right thing.' ").
328. See also Reisman, supra note 140, at 321 ("Developments in communications and
transportation have enhanced the possibilities of infiltration and subversion, of protracted low-
level conflict by well-supplied proxies, of preprogrammed 'popular' uprisings, followed by 'in-
vitations' from local inhabitants and so on."). Id. at 330 ("Thus, even revisions of law that are
believed to redound to the benefit of the United States will leave... United States supported
actions in Central America readily available for moral judgments.").
329. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
330. Thus, United States Army Rangers were utilized in the Panamanian invasion. See
Picture, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 22, 1989, at A14.
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other countries.33 ' The counter-terrorism bureaucracy has thus been
used to aid foreign policy goals more general than simply halting the
spread of terrorism.
The last example of the Shultz doctrine in application falls under the
narco-terrorism label as well. In early January 1990, Colombia stated its
consternation at the rumor that the United States was sending a naval
task force to block ocean and air shipping from the Colombian coast.
The Bush administration flatly denied the blockade plan,332 then con-
ceded the next day that the plan had existed but was aborted in the wake
of the "political firestorm in Colombia." '333 The novel use of warships to
preemptively halt shipping off a foreign coast in the name of narco-ter-
rorism prevention is more interesting than the inability of the executive
branch to present a united front.334 Given the use of United States naval
aircraft to force down the airliner carrying the Achille Lauro pirates,335
no great stretch of the imagination is required to classify the two actions
as parallel uses of the antiterrorism bureaucracy described by NSDD
138.336
These three examples are presented to alert the reader to these de-
veloping tools in the counter-terrorist arsenal and may aid future discus-
sion in this area of study.
By Peter Richman*
331. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. .
332. White House Denies Plans for Blockade Off Colombia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990, at
A14, col.2 ("The administration was considering use of the Navy, but.., a blockade was not
among the options.").
333. Friedman, Drug War Move Irks U.S. Allies, Newsday, Jan. 10, 1990, at 7 (though a
State Department Spokeswoman continued to deny the blockade plans, Marlin Fitzwater,
White House Spokesman, "indicated last week that the United States had already made the
decision [to use the Navy]. And Larry Birns ... said the Pentagon had all but decided weeks
ago ... to divert ships on routine duty in the Atlantic to the Caribbean to stand watch for drug
smugglers.").
334. "U.S. officials vigorously denied [the blockade] and said the ships [an aircraft carrier,
a nuclear-powered cruiser, and their support group] would merely monitor and 'interdict' air-
craft and boats suspected of carrying drugs." Id.
335. Reisman, supra note 140, at 329.
336. See supra notes 178-188 and accompanying text.
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